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ON DIFFERENCE AND EQUALITY
Cynthia V. Ward
Arizona State University
The concept of "difference" forms the core of contemporary attacks on
"liberallegalism"l and is central to proposals for replacing it. 2 Critics charge
that liberal law quashes ditIerence because it grounds political equality and
individual rights in the assumption that all persons share certain "samenesses," such as rationality or autonomy. In the words of the philosopher
Iris Marion Young, "liberal individualism denies difference by positing the
self as a solid, self-sufficient unity, not defined by or in need of anything or
anyone other than itself."3 The claim is that this "sameness"-based vision of
equality is in fact an exercise of power, reflecting a highly specific model of
personhood that was constructed by and for a white male elite and nsures
I am grateful lO Bruce Ackerman, Jeffrie Murphy, Fernando Teson, and th e facully at the
College of William and Mary for valuable comments.
1. The phrase "liberal legalism " describes a system of law grounded in the principles of
liberal phi losophy; as used in feminist and critical-race th eory it has become a term of
opprobrium. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, When (I StOlY IsJust a Sto')': Does Voicp Really M(lUer?, 76
VA. l.. REv. 95, 103 (1990) (expressi ng frustration of criti cal-race theorislS with premises of
liberal legal ism); Catharine MacKinnon , TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 170 (1989)
("Including, bu t beyond, the bourgeois in liberal legal ism, li es what i, male about it "); Robin
West, Jurisprudence and CenclPt', 55 U. CH I. L. REv. 1 (1988) (argu in g that liberal legal ism is
"essentially and irretrievably masculine ") .
2. Discussions of "difference " abound in feminist and critical-race theory, as well as in
poslmodern literature generally. See, e.g., Anne Dailey, Feminism s Retum to Libemlism, 102 YALE
L.J. 1265 (1993) (discussing importance of "differen ce" question in feminist jurisprudence);
Sheila Foster, DijJenmce (l7ui Equ(llity: A Cli/iad AJ.\·essment oj the unaj)/ 0/ "Div;:/J-;t); " 1993 WIS. L.
REV. 105 [hereinafter FOSler, DiJ//!Tence and Equality); Angela P. Harris, Foreword: The J1l1'isprudence of R£(.(mstruction, 82 CALIF. L. REv . 741 (1994) ; Iris Marion Young, Polity and Omup
DijJermce, 99 ETH ICS 250 (1989); Iris Marion Young, The ideal of Community alld the Politics of
Difference, in FE~U N I SM / POSTMODERNISM 300 (Linda J. icholson cd.) (1990) [hereinafter
Young, 71.. ideal 0/ Comm.unity]; Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engtmdered, 101 HMv. L. REv.
10 (1987); Martha Minow, When Dlf/erence Ha" Its Home: Group Homes /or the Mell tolly Reto·rded,
Equal Protectioll (lnd Legal Treatment o/Dif/erence, 22 HARV. C. R. C. L. L. Rt:;v. I II (1987); Martha
Minow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION , EXCLUSION, .".ND AAEIUCAS LAw (1990) [hereinafter Minow, Making all the DifJeren ce); Iris Marion Young, J USTICE AND THE POUTICS Of DIFFERENCE (1990) [hereinafter Young, Justice and the Politics 0/ Difference).
3. Young, The Meal 0/ Communit)\ .",pra note 2, at 307. See also Minow, M([ki1lg AUthp Differencl',
supm note 2, at 377 ("Righ ts analysis . .. fai ls to supply a basis for remaking ... institutions to
accommodate difference. Integrated into institutions not designed with them in mind, formerly marginalized people may simply become newly marginalized or stigmatized"). As I
discu.s..' below, mOst critics (i ncluding Young) attack a specific type of liberalism, which celebrates individual autonomy and agency and advocates their maximization via a legal system
grounded in individual tights. Thus, not all forms of liheralism are subje<;l to all of the
ctiticisms made here. See infm note 13 and accompanying text.
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its continued social dominance. 4 Liberalism's cntlcs conclude that the
achievement of social justice will be possible only when sameness-based
conceptions of equality are rejected.5
Their argument launches two foundational attacks on liberal theory.
First, the charge that liberalism "denies difference" is the primary means by
which critical theorists contest liberalism's commitme nt to equality. Second,
that charge appears to contradict the claim that liberal socie ties maximize
"diversity" by allowing all individuals the largest possible quantity of freedom to live out their own particular visions of the good life. In response to
critics like Young, for example, liberal theorist William Galston argues that
"purposive liberalism ... comes closer than any other form of human association, past or present, to accommodating human differences. It is 'repressive' not in comparison with available alternatives but only in relation to
unattainable fantasies of perfect liberation. "6
The legal and political outcomes of this dispute could be dramatic, for
"difference " theorists translate their challenges to liberalism into reform
proposals that could require substantial restructuring of liberal political
and legal institutions. Martha Minow, for example, advocates a restructuring of rights in ways that would de-emphasize their autonomy-protecting
function and instead help to preserve relationships and empathic, difference-respecting dialogue. 7 Sheila Foster claims that "we must establish
institutional participatory patterns that accept and value the contributions

4. See, e.g. , Christine A. Littleton , Reconstrncting Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1282
(1987) ("As a concep t, equality suffers from a 'mathematical fallacy'-lh al is, the view that only
things that are the same can ever be equal"); Minow, Making all the DijJer-ence, supra note 2, at
149 ("Both the historical and heuristic versions of [Iiberall social contract theory claim to be
inclusive, participatory, and egalitarian, yet both replicate the process of exclusion and subordination that preserves the two tracks of legal treaunent"); id. (noting that 'The U.S. Constitution l is ba~ed on liberal principles and ] is a document pcoduced t11rough an indisputably
exclusionary process"); Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, su.pm note 2, at 164-66
(claim ing that "politics of difkrence .. . promotes a notion of group solidar'ity against the
individualism ofliberal humanism ,"whi ch is characterized by an "assimi lation ist ideal" that sets
facially neutral "norms" that in fact disadvantage oppressed groups).
5. Harris, .Jurisprudence oj Rewnst'YUction, supra note 2, at 76 1 (critical-rac e theorists advance
an idea of "equality based not on sameness but on difference"; id. at 770 (critical-race theory
attempts to refigure equality in ways beyond sameness a nd difTerence); Minow, When Difference
Has Its Home, supra note 2, a t 113 (explaining main goal of article is to argue that "categorical
approaches" to law. which attribute "difference" to different people, undermine commitments
to equali ty); Minow, Making All the DijJerence, supra note 2, at 50, 74-75 (contesti ng idea of
equality as samen ess); Young, Po/it), and Group Differenre, su.pra note 2, at 250-51.
6. William Galston, I .II3ERAL P URPOSf~~: GOODS. VIRTUES Al D OrVERSITI IN TI-IE LI\.lERAL STATE 4
(1991). See also Bruce Ackerman, SOCIAL J USTICE IN THE I.IBERAI. STATE 18 (1980) (advocating "a
liberal conception of equality that is compatible wi th a social order rich in diversity of talents,
personal ideals, and forms of community"); Ronald Dworkin , TAKING RiGHTS SER10USLY 272-73
( 1977) (defining "liberal conception of equality" as mandating that government "must not
constrain liberty on the ground that one citizen 's co nception of the good life is nobler or
superior to another's").
7. Minow, Making All the DifJerl!11.CI!, su.pra note 2. at 227- 390 (defending he r vision of "rights
in rela tionship").
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of those d ifferences that have been left out."8 Scholars have argued th at
properly accounting for racial "difference" imp lies the abolishment of Title
VII and the re imagining of the law of employment discrimination and equal
protection.9 And Iris Marion Young proposes a "politics of diflerence " that
would incorporate "a principle of representation for oppressed groups in
democratic dec ision ma king bodi es," as well as other group-based rights. lO
In Part I of this Article I analyze the li beral value of dive rsity; in Parts II
and IlI, I compare it with antiliberal conce p tions of difference; in Part IV,
I evaluate the connection of "difference ," as conceived by critics of liberal
legalism, to the unde rlying and (I argue) more fundamental value of
equality.
"Difference" advocates advance their legal reform proposals in the name
of true equality-equality grounded not in sameness but in difference." 1
conclude that, although equality can and should accommodate a wide range
of d ifferenc es, these efforts to construct equality from difference eviscerate
the concept of equal ity. To argue, as "difference " th eorists do, for the
prioritization and celebration of equal ity base d on "d ifferen ce" is to argue
against any found ational commitment to equali ty. To the extent it adds
anything new to lega l discussion , "difference" theory is necessarily anliequality.
I. LIBERAL DIVERSITY

Liberal tend to speak of respecting "diversity" rather than "difference ," and
this reflects more than a semantic disagree ment with their critics. 12 The two
8. FOSler, Difference nnti t;qualit.» "upm note 2, at 156.
9. See, e.g. , Roy L. Brooks and Mary Jo Newborn , Critical /lace Theory and Classical·Liberal Ciuil
Rights Scholanhip: A Distinction Without a Differen(e?, 82 CAL L REV. 787. 804-44 ( 1994) .
10. Young, j ustice (md the Politics of Diffrrence, SlIpm note 2, <ll 15S.
11. See, e.g., Foster, D{[frrPnGe and Equali!.y, sulna note 2, <It 110- 11 (exam inin g concept of
diversity und er "hybrid equality paradigm" and con cl uding th at "[l]O be useful in achieving
th e goal of equality, a diversity ralionale should recogn ize th ose differences that have bee n
construcled into a basis for, and have resulted in , system ic exclusion an d di sadvantage fo r
individuals possessing th ose differences. "); id. al147-61 (affirm ing im porlance of equality goal
an d advocating id ea lh al explicil recogniti on of soc ia ll y relevant difre rences is necessary lO
achi eve il); Allan C. Ilutchi nso n, Identit), Cri.,,~<: The Politics of Interpretation, 26 NI'.\\' ENG. L. RH'.
1173, 1192 (1992) (on postmodern view of difTerence, "th e subjecl becomes a site for lhe
conslant and continuing su'uggle to take on an identity thal is conducive to a u'uly egalitarian
society"); id. at 1208 (,The triumph of a tru ly democratic politics wi ll only occu r when the
author-mon arc h is finally dead and a polity o f t.ru ly qual readers and "'Titers is established and
Ij,'ed"); Young, Polity and Group Dijfrrence, iltlna nOle 2, at251 ("the inclusion and participa tjon
of everyone in public discussion an d decision making requires mechanisms for group re prese ntation "); Young, jltstice and the Politics o/Difference, mpm note 2, al 173 (assumin g lhal "(a I
goal of soc ial justice . . . is soc ial equality," which "refers primarily to the fu ll participa tion and
inclusion of everyone in a soc iety'S major institutions, a nd the socially su pported substantive
opportu ni ty for all to develop and exercise th eir capaci ties an d realize th eir cho ices").
12. Th e term "diversity" is a lso ,,~dely employed to refer to efforts by p rivale a nd public
entities to hire women and memhers of rac ial and ethnic minorit.ies. "Diversi ty" is thus a
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ideas have significantly dissimilar content, and in th e e nsuing discussion I
examine and compare them.

A. Content of Liberal Diversity
Although they often fail to acknowledge it, contemporary "difference"
theorists do not really attack liberalism per se, but only those versions of
liberal thought that assume the presence of threshold levels of rationality,
autonomy, and/ or age ncy in all human individuals and draw from this
foundational assumption the political conclusion that equal, and individual , rights ought to form th e basis and the boundaries of the state. However,
since autonomy- and rationali ty-based liberal th eo ri es a bound,13 such criticisms have potential powe r.
All students of liberalism are familiar with the slogan tha t a liberal state
must allow each person the greatest possible freedom to pursue his or her
vision of the good life. 14 This principl e derives directly from two underlying
assumptions; first, that people are importantly the same, and therefore
dese rve an equal opportunity to choose and direct th eir lives l 5; and second,
that people are also importantly differe nt, which means that, given an equal

description of a particula r justification for aflirmatjve actio n in hiring, a justification that
focuses on th e benefits to the h iring organizations and/ or society at large 01' including within
these organizations members of previously unrepresented , or underrepresented groups. This
pol itical meaning of diversity should be d istingui shed both from th e th eoretical claims of
liberafism outlin ed above, and from t.he discussion below of difference theory. Indeed, the
diversity ratio na le for am"mative action is para.'itie upon a socie ty's p,;or d ecisions as to what
differe nce is and which d ifferences do, or shou ld, ma t ter. See, e.g., Fost.er, DifJerenr.e and EqlU1.lil)\
supra note 2, a t 109 ("Diversity has been used as a code word for a variety of difTerences"); it/.
at 111 ("th e current concept of diversity is 'empty' because it lacks a mediating principle. By
U'eating all differen -es the same, it ignores the 'salience' o f ce rtain diffe rences in this ~ociety
by extracting differences fro m their sociopol itical contexts").
13. See, e.g., Ackerman, SIlpm note 6, at 182, 196 (exp laining importance of a utonomy in
liberaf theory); ill. a t 4-7 (ou tlining conceptio n of rational it)' th at forms basis for amhor's own
brand of liberalism); Rich ard H . Fallon Jr., Two Senses oj Au/onomy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 875, 876
(1994) ("A view tracing to Kant majntains that o th er va lues possess their worth only because
r<ltional, autonomous agents find them worth pursuing."); J ohn Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
515-16 (197 1) ("Fo ll owing tlle Kantian in terpretation of justice as fa irn ess, we can say that by
acting from these principles [ofjustice] persons are acting autonomously: they are ac tin g from
principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that best ex press their nature as free
and rationaf beings... . Thus, moral education is education for autonomy").
14. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 6, a t 54-55 (artic ul ating requi rement that liberaf principle of neutrality "does not distinguish the merits of competing concep tions of the Good ");
Gafston, supra note 6, at J 0 ("the libe t'al conception of the good . .. allows for a wide though
not wholly un constrained pluralism among ways of life. It assumes th at ind ividu als have special
(though not wholly unerring) insight into their own good . And it is consistent with the
mini mization o fpubJi c resU'aints on indh~dllals "); Rawls, wpm no te 13, at 92-93 ("[AJ person's
good is determined by what is for him Ihe most rational long-term plan of life . . . . To put it
briefl y, tlle good is the satisfac tion of rationa l d esire").
15. See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AtrrONOMY 3 1 (1988) ("Moral
respect is owed to a.ll because a ll have tlle ca pacity for d efini ng tllemsclves").
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chance to choose, their actual choices ,\~I\ vary 16 Because liberalism posits
normatively that all people h ave equal moral worth, the em pirical fact of
human differe nce ma nda tes respect for each pe rso n 's "right to be different" and to have his differences tolerated by o the rs.17
Three relevant conclusions follow from this. First, liberal diversity theo ry
does not rely upon any particular account of the source of hum an dive rsi ty.
By imply acceptin g human difference as a given and fitting respect for it
within the ge neral rubric of liberal eq uality th ory, liberali m sid esteps
continuing d ebates over the com parative responsibility of bi ology a nd social
construction for human behavior a nd personality. The vel-sion of liberalism
discussed here merely assum s that, what ver th sou rce and extent of
difference , adult huma n beings possess at least some autonomous control
over important life choices. III
Second , in an important sense liberal diversity is a derivative value; that is,
its normative status in liberal theory proceeds from the liberal's primary
respect for th e equalily of individuals, a respect that when married to the
e mpiri cal fact of hum an dilIere nces requires the libe ral to value diversity
and to create the political con dition of individual freedom through which
to recogniz it. 19 Because humans are the same in certain ways, they must be
given an equal cha nce to live their lives to the fullest; and beca use humans
are also importantly different, a n equal chance mandates indi\~dual freedom and a respect for diversity_ Note that the strength of this diversity value
can range, consist ot with this conclusion, fro m mere toleration to affirmative respe t an d admiration for difference. hat is, a liberal can consistently take eithe r the view that her own way of life is bes t but the different
cho ices of oth ers must be accommodated because, as indi~ dual s possessi ng
16. See, e. g., John Stuart Mill, ON Ll BER't"Y: ANNOTATED TE:XT, SOURCES. AN D BACKGROUND
CRITICISM 65 (David Spitz ed. 1975) ("Such are the differences am ong human bein gs in the ir
sources of pleasure, their susceptibiliti es of pain , and the ope ra tion on th em of different
physical and mora l agencics, that unl ess thcre is a corresponding diversi ly in their modes of
life, they neither obtain thcir fair share of happiness, nor grow up to the me n tal, moral, and
aesthetic statu re o f which the ir nature is ca pablc·'); Robert Nozick, ANARCHY, STATE. AND
UTOPIA 308-{)9 ( 1974) (discussing ex tensive d iversity of human beings); Amartya Sen, INEQ AUTY REEXAM INED 19- 21 (1992) (discussing impact of "extensive human d iversi ty" on
equality theory) .
.17. See, e.g., Michel Ro enfe lrl, Substantive Equa.tily and Equal Opportunity: 1\ j utlspnuilmlial
Appraisal, 74 C"" .. L. REv. 1687, 1702 (" In its broadest terms, then , eq ual iti es must be co nstructed so that those who are different are nOt .-egarded as in feriors, and con fo rmin g
iden tities are nOt imposed upon them .. J.
18. .'iee, e.g. , Fa llo n, supra notc 13, at 887-88 (defendin g conception of descriptive au tonomy
an d noti ng tha t "lh e self, th ough sil.Uated and socially COnStilu t.ed, remains capable of apprcciating her situated con dition, of assessing and cri ti cizing her assump tions and values, and of
re\~sing her goal and commi tm ents .... The se lf is a crea l.Ure ill and of th e world, but one
capable of at leasl partially transformi ng herself through though t, cri ticism, and se lf-interpretation").
19. See Sen, StljJra note 16, at 12-16 (noting that "every normative theory of soc ial arrangement lhat has at a ll slood the lest of lime seems to dem and equality of sOlllethi71g--someth ing
tha t is regarded as part.ic ularly important in that theor y," and th us that "th e battle is nOl, in an
important sense, about 'why eq ua lity?' , but aboul 'eq uali ty of what?'").
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autonomy, agency, or whatever, they have the right to be wrong, or the view
that there are many equally valuable "visions of the good life," and that she
should therefore be encouraging to, and welcoming of, visions that differ
from her own. Both approaches assume a value for diversity that follows
coherently from a liberal understanding of equal respect for individual
personhood.
Third, liberal equality serves as both the value that grounds respect for
diversity and as the boundary to diversity. One's right to pursue one's own
vision of life, which derives from the liberal's equal respect for all people,
is simultaneously limited by the equal right of everyone else to do the same.
"To each his own" is a liberal sentiment that does not apply to persons
whose vision of self-maximization requires the murder or torture of others.
In short, liberal respect for diversity is both derivative of, and subservient
to, the foundational liberal value of (sameness-based) equality. Ov r time,
however, the exact relationship betvveen these tvvo values has shifted, driving liberalism toward visions of equality that h av continued to embrace
foundational sameness but have also increasingly acknowledged the profundity of human difference.
B. Diversity and Liberal Equalities

It is important to distinguish betvveen tvvo relevant meanings of equality.
The first refers to equality as a distributive principle, as a particular means of
implementing a deeper equality ideal-via libertarian "equal rights,"20 or
equal distribution of resources,21 or of primary goods,22 etc. At this level the
argument is not over whether human beings are the same (and therefore
equal) in some descriptive sense, but ov r which form of egalitarian distribution of resources will best serve an already accepted equality premise.23
The second meaning of equality refers to the just~fication of political and
legal egalitarianism, advancing an answer to the question , Why should we
arrange society and law so as to guarantee equal distribution of
- - -resource (s) ?24
20. See, e.g., id. at 22 ("Libertarian demands for liberty typically include important featmes
of 'equal liberty,' e.g., the insistence on equal immu ni ty from interference by othel·s").
21. Ronald Dworkin, What Is Etl'lalil)'~ Part 1: Equality QJWelfare, and What Is Equality? Part 2:
Equality oj &sources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFr. ( 1981).
22. Rawls, supra note 13.
23. Amy Gutmann may be drawing this distinction between liberalism 's equality a.numptions,
which she defines as the function of "describing people as equal beings ... ," and ega.litarianism. which she defines as the justifying a more equ<ll distribution of goods, services, and
opportunities among those people." Amy Gutmann, LIBERAL EQUALHY2 (1980).
24. Amartya Sen, supra note 16, at 12-30, discusses these two ideas, noting that "[ tlwo
central issues for ethical analysis of equality are: (1) Why equality? (2) Equality of What?"
Discussing the work ofJohn Rawls, Ronald Dworkin notes a similar differen ce between Rawls's
two conceptions of equality, which consist of claims with respect to the disu'ibution of goods,
and claims to equal concern and respect for all individuals, Dworkin, sul,ra note 6, at 180-82.
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The con n ection ben.\'een these two meanings of equality has changed
significantly within liberal theory. According to its now-standa rd tale, liberalism's earli est vision of egalitarianism found its legal expres ion in the view
that individuals have "equa l rights." This vision of legal equality, also characterized by the phrases "equal treatment" and "formal equality," interpreted equa l righ ts to mandate ide ntical treatm ent, resulting in the
principle that th e law may not treat similarly situated persons differently.25
Th e legal prin ci ple of equal treatment begins from a justification of
equality that relies on some sh ared trait-some "same ness"-among all
hum ans (for example, a utonomy, age ncy, capacity to have a vision of the
good life and ac t upon it, or capaci ty for "moral personality"), and proceeds
mechanically to import this "sameness" justification into the legal and
poli ti al sph eres via the principle of "equal rights." Equal treatment is based
on the idea that, b cause people are (in relevant ways) the'ame, the law
should treat them the same.
Although fundamental samen ess has re mained the core ju tification of
liberal equality, the same ness-based egalita rian princip le has been succeeded
by a myriad of reformul ation s of the m eaning of legal a nd political egalitarianism, among wh ich (Ire the closely related principles of "equal concern, "26
"equal a ep ta n ce,"~7 and "equal opportunity. "28 These principles began to
open a divide betwee n th e samen ess-based justification for legal equality and
the proper means of imp Ie men Ling it. They sought legally to express the view
that lib rallaw ho uld e ndorse different treatment for diffe rent pe rsons in the
service of the unde rlying principle that people are, in the relevant libe ral
senses, the same. Progressive liberal theodsts argued that treating everyone
the same necessarily e rased important a nd relevant differences among them.
Altho ug h human s share a uton o my, they aJso have differen ces that make
treatment "as a n equal" in consi sten t with identical treatment.29
Two things are important about this. First, th e progression of liberalism
discussed above worked a sig nificant cha nge in the re lationship between
equality and diversity within the li beral framework. Equal treatment was
found in adeq uate as a legal principle precise ly beca use it was in fundamental tension with diversity, and libe ral philosophers concluded that treating
people the same took insufficient account of th eir diffe rences and was
therefore a viol.al.ion of liberal equali ty prope rly co nceived.
Second, the liberal progression from e qual treatment to a mandate of
"treatment as equals" allered the relationship betwee n equality as justitica25. See. e.g.. A kcrman . sujml no te G, at 18 ("Cc n a in forms of eq ual u'eaUllCnl-say. formal
eq uali ty in th > adm in istration o f justice-have been cenlral LO th e libera l u·adition"). For a
conte1l1pora ry defc n se of this idea. see gel!l'mJ/y ozick, supra. notc 16.
26. Dworkin , supra note 6. at 180.272-78.
27. LiuJcton . supra no te 4, at 1284-85.
28. Hel'lll a Ilill Kay, Ef/u(llily (lml Dif!n'f'll rP: The C(l.~P!f P"'gllfll1.C)1 I BERKELEy WOMEN'S LJ. 1,
26-27 ( 1985).
29. Dworkin , ""I)m note 6. at 180-82.
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tion and equality as a di tributiv principle. The changes within lib ralism
have d monstrated that a sameness-based justification of equaliLy doe not
necessarily imply egalitarian tr atment, but can mandate different treatment for those with sp cial ne ds JIO
Thus, critical attacks on liberalism for advocating equality based on
~sa m eness" do not inherently engag liberal distributive principles- which
are now fully compatible with the id a of different treatment. The attacks
must therefore addres only the liberal justification that those distributiv
principles grow out of some basic samen ss-rationality, autonomy, or
whatever-shar d by humans as humans.
It is true that justifications of liberal prin iples of I gal equality, even in
th ir progressiv modes, are ultimately grounded in descriptive assumptions of human sameness. Asked why peopl should be "treated as equals"
legally, the liberal replies by articulating some common faculty related to
th capacity of persons for agency, autonomy, rationality. or a variant that
justifies whatever v rsion of political and legal equali ty the liberal finds
appropriat . The move from "equal treatment" to "treatment as equals"
simply break the symmetrical connection between equality as justification-the desCliptive sense in which all humans are the same-and political-legal egalitarianism, which has moved from being grounded in sameness
to th acknowledgment of difference. The failure to recognize certain
differ nces has become a failure to treat all people as equals. Thu , a
contemporary liberal society can justify the expenditur of public funds to
construct sp cial sidewalk and building ramps for the physically disabled.
although this involves treating disabled persons differently from the nondisabled, on the principle that the disabled , as equal per ons in the sen e
relevant to such access, deserve " qual concern and respect," which in turn
commands equ al access to the public sphere. And lib ral feminists have
argued that equal access can mean different treatment-such as special
workplace accommodation for pregnant women 31-that is nevertheless
grounded in women 's fundamental sameness to men.

30, Other forms of Iiberalism-e,g" u ti li tarian ones--demunstra,e that egal itarian treatment does not require descriptive same ne.ss a, its base. A liberal utilitarian might simply assert
that eq ual respect for th e rights and freedoms of individuals-the idea that each coun ts for
one, and no more than o ne- maximizes utili ty, however thaL function is defined, (But why does
it do so? 'Why does treating people equally maximize utility? B cause human s g >nerally have a
preference to be treated equally? If so, is that in itself, or is the capacit), to experi ence happiness
or uffering, an indication of some fundamental same ness? Since a "yes'· answer to that
que tion would simply fold utilitaIianism into the general argument of this es ay, while a "no "
answer leaves the argument untouched , I wi ll put aside u til itariani sm for the mome n t. Bu.t see
infm, text accompanying note 150,
31. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 28, at 22 (proposi ng "e pisodi c analysis" that would "take acco unt
of biologi al reproductive sex d ifferences and treat them as legally significant only when they
ar being u til ized fo r reproductive purposes. "); id, at 27 ("in order to maintain the woman 's
equality of opportunity during her pregnancy, we should modify as far as reasonably possible
those aspects of ber work where her job performance is adversely affected by th e pregnan cy,
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Still, even in its contem porary form diversity remains subservi nt to
equality within liberalism-a fact that motivated the liberal civil-rights
movement. Implied in the liberal convictions th at equality is a valu more
basic than dive rsity, and th a t persons are equal b cause they ha re certain
threshold capa ities, i th notion th at differences among hum a ns may not
be used to undermine 1 gal equali ty. Indeed, for a liberal, history teaches the
dangers of over-focusi ng on diffe rences. Liberals are alert, for exam ple, to
th e huma n prope nsity to falsely a sume fundamental difference in the
character, int lIigence, or p rsonali ty o f oth ers based on immutable characteristics such as skin a lar, ge nd r, or physical ha ndicap, which are in fact
unrelated to the moral worth of p rsons. Lib rals h ave attempted to see
through su h differenc s to the esse ntial hum a ni ty32 of (for example)
wom e n, racial minorities, a nd h a ndi capped p rsons.
In short, large groups of people, including racial minorities, women , and
the handicapped, have in the past been miscategorized as infe rior, when
differences betvvee n the m and the majority have either been inven ted or
translated into justifications for ignoring their claim to equal personhood .
Th e history of lib ralism d emonstrates that these miscategorizations can be
corrected via th a rgument tha t such gro ups of persons share the basic
samenesses that justify treatm n t as equals under liberal law.
In an important e n e, liberali m 's cri tic atte mpt to reverse the liberal
relation hip betw n equality a nd diversity. '\o\Thile libe rals treat cliversity as
subservien t to, a nd dependent upon, equality, critics of liberalism reject the
id a that equality can or should be ba ed on an a sumption of ameness
among all persons and em phasize instead the irreducible importance of
human ditference.33

II. ESSENTIALIST DIFFERENCE

A. Sameness as Domination
At the heart of rna t theoretical a ttacks on "liberal I galism " is the claim
tha t, contrary to th eir xpr ss co mmitm nts, libe ral institutions are main-

Unless we do so, she will e pe lience employme n t disadva n tages arisin g from her reproduc6ve
activity Ulat are nOt e ncou ntered by her mal e 'o-worke r"); ill. (episodic analysis ~wi ll enable
rJle law to trea t women differe ntly than men during a lim ited period when their need s may be
grea ter than th ose of men as a way of ensu ring that women will be equa l to men with respect
to their overall enlployme l1l o pportunities"); Littleton . sup-ra no te 4, at 1283 (argu in g that
"eq uality an be ... reconstructed as a mea ns of chall engin g, rather tlla n legiti mating, social
insti tutions crea ted from th e phallocentri pe rspective."); id. at 1284 (adva ncin g notion of
equality as accep tance and averring that "[tlo achi ve this form o f sexual equality, male an d
female 'differen 'es' must be costle 's relative to eac h oUler").
32. ubddined as rational ily. capacity for moral personal ity, agency, Ctc.
33. Mino\\', Making Aillhe Difference, .m/ml. note 2. at 146-47.
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tained by and for a white male elite that hides its domination of society
be hind e mpty claims to respect the equal moral worth of all persons. ~4 Of
course, the critics do not need to claim that liberalism suppresses all diffe rence; they co uld even acknowledge that, within the constraints of its core
assumptions about human n ature-assumptions th at justifY its view of
equality-liberal theory allows the flourishing of many visions of the good
life. 35 It is those constrain ts, howev r, that radical dirrerence th eorists target
as parochial and highly restri ctive. 36 Indeed, according to this view the
libe ral's boun ded respect for "diversity" actually suppresses the acknowledgm e nt of fundamenta l "differe nce."
B. The Relational " Different Voi ce"

Reduced to its core components, th e attack on liberal diversit)1 makes two
claims. Critics charge first that lib ralism mi sdescribes human nature by
assuming and celebra ting individual autonomy and choi c while simultan ously excluding from law and politics important parts of the self such as its
interde pe nde nce and/ or relational capac ity37; and second, that those ig-

34. See, P.g., Derrick Re ll , FOI'I!word: 7/lP Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 liAR\'. 1.. REv. 4, 6--8 (l985)
(d iscussing conu'adiction betwet:n America's ideal of t:q uali ty an d its realily of racism. and
argi ng that "[m ]uch of what is call ed the law of civil t 'ighL~ ... has a mythologica l or fairY-La le
quality"); Harris, j 'lllispmd,mce oj Ummstru.f/hm, supra note 2, a l 7.'l4 (cri lical-race theory "PUI)'
law's supposed objectivity an d neutrali ty o n trial, argui ng th at whal look. like race-neu udlity
on the sut'fact: has a deeper structure th al rdlecLS white privilege."); ill. at 759 ("Histor)' has
shown that racism can coexist happi ly with formal commitm ents to obj ectivity, neutrahty, and
colorblindness"); Catharine MacKinnon , TOWARD A FE.\.fINIST T II EO RY OF THE STATE 220-2 1
(1989) (liberal conce ption o f eq uality as empl oyed in sex d iscrintimlljon law conceals "the
substa ntive way in whic h man has become the mea 'ure of all things); id. ~t 224 ("Men 's
physiology defines most SPOrtS, th eir h ea lth needs larg-e ly d efin e insuranc!: c(}wrage, their
socially d esigned biographies define workplace expectati ons and successful career patterns,
their perspectives and concerns define quality in sch olarship, th ei r experienct:s ,md obsessions
define merit, thei r militar y service defines citizenship , the ir presence defines fami ly. thei r
inabi li ty to get along \\~th each o ther-th eir wars and rulerships-defines h isLOry, th t:ir itttage
defines god , and their ge ni tals define sex. These arc the standards that are presented as gender
n eutral"); Youn g, justiCl' and thp Politics oJDiJJPTmrr, mpm note 2, at 168-69 (arguing that liberal
quality tJleory has effect of excl uding those labeled "differen t"); irl. at 173 ("policies th at are
u niversally form ul ated and thus blin d to differences of race, cu lturt:, ge nder, age, or disability
often perpetuate rather [han undennin e oppre sion ").
35. See, e.g., Mino\\', Making All/he Dif[m'nre, Sl/lml note 2. at 146-49; You ng.jus/icp lIlIl/tile
Politics oj Difference, supra no te 2, at 157 ("En lightenment ideal:; of liberty ami political c'l uality
did and do inspire movements against oppression and dom in ation , whose success has crt:aled
social values and institutions we wou ld n ot walll to lose").
36. See, e.g., Minow, IHakillg All the DiffeTrnrp, ""'I,m note 2. at 152 ("The [libera l] social
contract. approach has been deeply exclusionary") ; Youn g, .ills/ire (lml thi' Politics vJ Di[[erI'11(1',
supra note 2, at 173 ("Policies that are universally formu lated and thus blind to differe nces
of race, culture, gender, age, or disabili ty often perpetuate rather than underminc oppression").
37. Commu ni tarians have been especially kecn on tJlis attack. ,yp f(Plll'mlly Michael Sandel ,
LIBERALlS~t AND Til E LI MITS OF J USTICE (1982).
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nored parts of th e self should be both celebrated and incorporated into our
legal institutions. 38
Accord ing to some critical scholars, the liberal focus on individual autonomy, while val idly descriptive of certain groups, obscures or suppresses
other, equally worthy visions of the good that emphasize the primary importance of relational ability and connectedness. This suppression, they
charge, has the effect in liberal societies of excluding from legal identity
groups that hold more communitarian worldviews. Much relational feminist work takes this approach, arguing, in the well-known words of Carol
Gilligan, for the inclusion of women's "different voice "39 into morallegitimacy and legal institutions. 4o
The normative implications of this relational critique of liberalism are
clear: "liberal legalis m " should either be supplemented with a legal system
that recognizes relevant ch aracteristics, such as relational capacity, that
lib ral law currently ignores,4) or liberal institutions should be replaced
altogether by a system of communitarian deliberation that celebrates more
important features and ideals of human society.42

38. See f?1erally Su~an na Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Co-lI.5titutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. ReV. 543 (1986) (citing Carol Gilligan and arguing for inclusion of women's
"different voice" into law); West, supra note 1 (arguing that law must incorporate women's
focus on co nnected ness as well as men's con cern with individual autonomy).
39. Carol Gilli gan, IN A OIFFE.R£NT VOI CE (1980).
40. For relational fem inist discussions that use Gillig-an 's ideas to criticae liberal law, see, e.g.,
West, supra nOle I , at 2-4, 14-26,42 (1988) (defending the "connec tion tllesis"-that women
differ essen tially from men because they are materially con nected to other human lives
through L11e malernal experien ce and therefore value connection and nurturing over au tonomy); Sherry, supra nOle 38, at 543, 579-84 (hypothesizing that women 's concerns about
connection, subjectivity, an d responsibility for others accord well with communitarian legal
structures while men's emphasis on autonomy, obj ectivity, and rights translates into liberalism) . For a similar thesi ' in the context of race relations, see, e.g., J acinda T. Townsend,
Reclaiming Se/fDettml1in(uion: A Call/or i nlraracial AdOPti(J1l, 2 0 KEJ. GENDER L. & POL'y 173, 181
(1995) ("The Black commun ity maintai ns its own set of family values, including collective
responsibility, se lf~ e le rmination, and cooperative economics. T hese values help define a
communi tarian Black so iely thal can be ontrasted with an individual rights based dominant
society").
CaLllarine MacKinnon, a cri tic of relational feminism , might nevertheless be placed in this
camp as she also appears to assume that although liberal auto nomy and the liberal state work
well for men, they oppress wom en; see, e.g., MacKinnon , supra note 34, at 157-70, 237-49
(1989) (attacking the liberal state and liberal theory as oppressive of women ). Unlike LIle
relational feminists, however, MacKinn on refuses to move beyond the critique ofliberalism to
define a positive vision of "woman 's point of view"; that is, to paint a picture of what a
posldomi nation world would look like. See, e.g., Catharin e MacKinn on, FEMI ISM NMODIHED
45 (1987) ("Take your foot off our necks, then we will hear in what tongue women speak").
Like relational feminists, Mac Kinnon has been attacked for "gender essentialism"; see f?1erally
Angela Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Them,. 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990)
( harging both MacKinno n and West wi th essentialism).
41. See f?1erally herry, supra note 38; West, supra note 1.
42. See, e.g. , Sandel, supra note 37 (pointi ng out fl aws in Rawlsian liberalism and arguing for
a communi rarian \~sio n of state). Some liberals have recently argued that liberalism an d
communitarianism are not essentially opposed; see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, WE THE PWPLE 1:
FOUNDATIONS (1991); Wi lliam Galston, LIBERAL PURPOSES (1991) .
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For these relational CritiCS , recognizing the importance of "ditlerence"
per se is not really a fundamental goal at all; for th m, a "diffe rence"
argument serves merely as a stalking horse for the endorsement of a
specific vision of the good that is allegedly suppress d by liberal legalism.
Either this vi ion should supple ment liberalism , for a ne t gain of one "voice"
in the law, or it should entirely replace liberalism, for a ne t gain of zero.
Their call is not to maximize the number of visions of the good held in
society or to celebrate "difference" in the abstract, but to claim recognition
for their particular re lational vision. In other words, were it irrefutably
shown to these theorists that their plans for reform would shrink the range
of p ermissible visions of the good (by, for example, eliminating all those
that h ave result d from the endorsem nt of liberalism in it curre nt form ),
they might well be indiffere nt.
But if this is all that is meant by calls for the fuller acknowledgement of
"difference" then there is no n eed to use th e concept a t all. We should
simply proceed to evaluate the substantive visions of the good advanced by
ditlerence advocat s and decide which of them (if any) to adopt.
III. DIFFERENCE AS INEQUALITY

A second line of attack on liberal diversity de ni es even the possibili ty
of individual autonomy as liberals conceive it. According to this argument, which grounds much critique of liberalism from postffiodern 43
~ minists and critical-race th orists, liberal autonomy is a false construct
that incorrectly assumes the presence and uncoerced choice-making
powe r of a unified individual self that in fact does not exist. 44 Advocates
of this seco nd \~ ew attack liberalism by attempting to destabilize or "deconstruct" ideas such as autonomy and individual seUhood. Such schclars
also attack the relational critics of liberalism for relying on falsely "essen-

43. The term 'postmodern" can mean many things, and I use it somewhat loosely in th is
anicle. Angela Harris has described the usc of this term in jurisprudential literature: "[Post·
modernism] suggest(sl th at wha t has been presented in our social-political and o ur intelleclLIal
traditions as knowledge, trlllh, o bjectivity, and reason are actually merely the eITe "ts of a
particular form of social power, the victory of a particul ar way of represe nting the world tha t
then presents itself as beyond mere in terpretation , as truth itself." Harris, supra no te 2, at 748.
44. See, e.g. , Hutchi nson , supra note 11, at 11 84-85 (" Rather than thin k of th e su bject as a
uni tary and sovere ign subject whose sell<.]irec ted vocation is to bring the world to heel th rough
the exacting discipline of rational inquiry, pos\JTIoderni5m interrogates the whole idea of
autonomo us subj ec tivi ty and absu-ac t r<;asol1; it places th em in a constan tly con tingent condi·
tion of provisionali ty"); id. at 11 92 ("posl.mode rni sts suggest that the tr-aditional notion of
authenticity-' to thine own self be true '-is an immediate patienl for postmodern surgery");
Young, TIU' Ideal oj r'()l1wl'Iln il)l supra note 2, at 300,310 ("The idea ortlle self as a unified subjec t
of desire and need and an origi n of assertion a nd action has been powerfully 'ail ed in to
qu estion by contemporar y philosophers") ; id. a t 308-09 (criticizin g liberal onception of
moral autonomy).

On Difference and Equality

77

tiali t" categories to describe, for xample, the differences b tween men
and worn nY' They criticize relational theorists for associating the
"male," or white majority, with lib ral autonomy and the "fe male," or
racial minority, with nurturing and community, and then using this
supposedly inh rent opposition to argue for the legal recognition of marginalized groups into law via communitarian reform of liberalism. 46 Antiessentialist scholars charge that such efforts to define, for example, a
"true female self' or a "true male self' deny the full range of human
difference. 47
In th ir critiqu of both liberal div rsity and relational views, postrnodern
difference theorists promote alternatives to liberal individualism that are
grounded in the cel bration of difference itself. 48 To remain internally
consistent, su h th eories must rely upon some nonessentialist understanding of persons for th charge that liberalism "d nies difference"49 and
the attendant call for fuller recognition of this concept.
A. Antiessential ist Difference

How is the liberal vision of "diversity" distinct from the concept of "difference" employed by liberalism's antiessentialist critics? The latter incor-

45. See, e.g., Judith Butler, Gcruier T1'Olible, Fc'nini.st 77zeory, and Psyclwan(llytic Di5couTsc, in
FlMINISM/ POSTMODERNISM 324, 338-39 (Linda J. Nichol on cd., 1990) ("Inasmuch a the
construct of women presupposes a specificity an d coherence that differenti ates it from that of
men , lhe categories of gender appear as an unproblematic point of deparl.ll,·e for feminist
politics. But if . .. 'sex' itself is a category produced in the in te reSL~ of the hetero exual
contract, or if we consider Foucaulr's suggestion l.hal . ex' desigr,ates an artificial unily thal
works to maintain and amplifY the regulation ofsexuality\\~thin the reproductive domain , the n
it seems that gender coherence operates in much the same way, not as a ground of politics bul.
as its effe
46. See, e.g.,Joan Williams, Deconstn.cting Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797 (1989). For criticisms
of feminist essentia lism, see gl'llerally Harris, ,,"pm notc 40; Elizabetl1 Spelman, INESSENTIAl.
WOMAN (1988). Criticism of relational feminist essentialism comes not on ly from postmodern
scholars but also from liberal and radical feminists. Se.e, e.g., J ean Ham pt.on, Feminist Contmetan:·
anism, in AMI D OF 0 E'S OWN: Ff;MINI$T EsSA\S ON REAsON AND OBJECfMTY 227,231 (1993)
(In the results of Gilligan's research showing that boys are more autonomous while girls are
morc caring. "I hear the voice of a child who is preparing to be a member of a dominating
group and th e voice of another who is preparing to be a member of the group that i
dominated"); Mac Kinnon , 5u/Jm note 40, at 38-39 (criticizing relational feminists for valuing
as essentially feminine charactelistics, such as nurturing and care, that are the result of male
domination).
47. See, e.g., H.uri ,supra nOle 40, at -85 (arguing Ihal resull of "gender esse ntialism " is "not
on ly thal some voices are silenc d in order to privilege olhers ... but t11 a lth c voices that are
si lenc d turn OLIl to be th e same voices silenced by the mainstream legal voice of We the
People-among them, Ih e voices of black women").
48. See, e.g., Minow, Mohillg All. the Difference, .HI.p m nOte 2, at 3-4 (raising \Vordes about the
process of categorization thal resulis in the onclusion of difference).
49. Young, Tlte Idnd o/Community, mpra note 2, at 307.
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porates five fundamental themes. First, differences between people-as
least insofar as they have social consequences-are results of social construction, not biological or freely chosen phenomena. 5o Se ond, the social
assignment of the label "different" to some groups, and the elevation of
that difference to political and/ or legal significance, is an exercise of
power by majorities or elite over the persons or groups so labeled. 51
Difference is both the product of, and guarantor of, the continued subordination of powerless groups. A corollary is that the naming and norming process themselves help to create persons who exemplify the
difference named. 52 Third, it is impossible to transcend difference in favor
of any objective "truth" about it, since each person is trapped within his

50. See, e.g., Foster, Difference and EquaWy, supra nOle 2, at I I I ("To be useful in achieving the
goal of equality, a diversity rationale should recognize those diITerences that have been
constructed into a basis for, and have resulted in, systemic exclusion and disadvantage for
individuals possessing tho~e differences"); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientati(}n and the Politic" af
Biology: A Critique of the Argument From bmnutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503,505 (1994) ("The
postmodern critique of liberal explanations of the self posits that culture , not human nature,
gives humans their sexual OIientations"); Harris, supra note 2, at 762 (discussing the postmodern "problem of the subject" and claiming that "( t)he language of race creates, maintains, and
destroys subjects, both inside and outside the law"); id. at 784 ("Racial commun ities, like other
human communities, are the products of invention, not discovery") ; Hutchinson, supra note
11 , at 1192 ("The subject is a cultural creation, not a biological given"); Hutchinson, Inessentially SPeaking (/.\' There Politics Ajler Posttllodernis'/1!~), 89 MICH. L. R EV. 1549, 1552 (1991) (book
review of Martha Min ow, Making AU the Difference) ("The postmodern temper has no eternal
truth to offer and no immutable knowledge to dispense; it accepts the historically situated and
socially constructed character of truths and knowledges"); id. at 1564 ("Differences are culturally imposed and socially policed "); Minow, Making All the Difference, supra note 2, at 19-23
(discussing social construction of difference in context of the "diITerence dilemmas" it produces).
5 1. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 45, at 326 (construction of the autonomous subject requires
domination and oppression); Hutchinson, supra note 50, at 1563 ("Domination has been
perpetuated and rationalized both by embracing difference (superiority of men over women
and white-skinned people over black-skinned people) and by eschewing difference (o-ea unent
of women as men and African Americans as white Europeans). These are the advantages that
have made the establishment of power overwhelmingly white and male "); Minow, Making AU
the Difference, supra note 2, at 50 (criticizing linkage in law between "difference" and "deviance"); id. at 53 ("Assertions of a difference as 'the truth ' may indeed obscure the power of the
person attributing the diITerence wh il e excluding important competing perspectives. Differen 'e is a clue to the social arrangements that make some people less accepted and less
integrated while expressing the needs and interests of others who constitute the presumed
model").
52. Harris, supr" note 2, at 762 ("The language of race creates, maintains, and destroys
subjects, both inside and o u tside the law"); Hutchinson, supra note 50, at 1554 ("The process
of labeling and naming is particularly fraught with dangers when it concerns people. To
categorize is to choose, and, in so doing, there is no escaping the responsibility of judgment
or its context of power") ; Minow, Makillg Ali the Difference, supra note 2, at 174-77 (identifying
labeling theory as antecedent to her social relations approach, and explaining that "labeli ng
theory studies the process by which an audience or commu ni ty identifies some people as
deviants. That very pattern of identification has consequences for the labeled person which
are difficult to escape. Those consequences include recurring patterns of exclusion and
deviant behavior. Labeling theory thus treats difference as an idea developed by some people
to describe others and to attri bute meaning to others' behavior") .

On Difference and Equa lity

79

or her own individual reality. 53 Fourth, the fact that difference is socially
constructed rather than "natural" or intrinsic opens up the possibility of
changing it and reforming society.54 Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
we should worry about the hierarchical deployment of difference labels
because on ly in doing so will we transcend liberal sameness-based equality55 and achieve real equality.56
1. Martha Minow's "Difference Dilemmas"

Professor Martha Minow's scholarship offers the richest discussion of this
view of difference as applied to law, and for that reason it merits close
scrutiny here.57 In her book, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion,
and American Law,58 Professor Minow criticizes American-style Jiberallegalism for reinforcing socially created difference through its reliance on five
false assumptions. 59 First, legal categories reinforce the invidious idea that
'''differences' are intrinsic, rather than viewing them as expressions of
comparisons bet\veen people on the basis of particular traits." T his assumption results in the assignment of the burden of difference to the person
deemed "different" rather than to society at large. Thus, a deaf child in a

53. Ser, e.g., Hutchi nson, supra note 50, at 1565 ("Although people are never nOl in a local
context, they are never in a contex t that is not open to conti ngent revision"); id. at 1570
("Wh il e persons are not red ucible to their autobiographies, they never fully escape them; they
forge their identities through the existential tension between confronting or confounding
their autobiographies"); Hutchinson , supra note II , at 1187 ("Embedded in a constitute
discourse of power, readers are also disciplined by the eXlarH protocols of power - th ey are
subjects in transition"); Minow, Making ali lhe Difference, supra note 2, at 53 ("There is no single,
superior perspective for judging questions of difference. No perspective asserted to produce
·the truth' is without a situated per pective, because any statemem is made by a person who
has a perspective").
54. See, e.g., Hutchinson, supra nOle 11, at 1209 ("In the face of the problematized subject,
postmodemism does not capitulate to or retreat from the task of struggli ng towards an
enhanced social solidarity and experien ce of justice. The hope is to em power su bjects by
making them individually aware of their capacity for self (re)creation and collectively responsible for establishing a mode of social life that mu ltiplies Ule opportunities lor transformative
action "); Minow. Making AlllllI! Differt'nce, SUP'I'(I note 2, at 53 ("DiITerence is a clue to the social
arrangements that make some people less accepted and less integrated while expressing the
needs and interests of others who constitute the presumed model. And social arrangemenL~
can be changed. An-angements thal assign the burden of "differences" to some people while
making others comfortable are histori cal artifaCt•. Maintaining these historical patterns embedded in the status quo is not neutral and cannot be justified by the claim that everyone has
freely chosen to do so").
55. See, e.g., notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., note II and accompanying texl.
57. See Hutchinson , 1II.pra note 50, at 1550-51 (reviewing Professor Minow's book Making All
the Differtmce and noting that "In the jurisprudential corner of poslIllOdern scholarsh ip, the
work of Martha Minow deserves especial attention . Infused with a posunodern perspective,
[Minow'sl writing stands at th e frontiers of modern legal thinking in its efforts to reject and
move beyond the modernist project of jurisprudence").
58. Supra note 2. Minow has also explained her view of difference, and her proposals to cure
the "difference dilemma," in her other work. See generally Minow, When DIfference Has Its HOI/Ie,
supra note 2; Min w, Fareword:Juslice £ngelldered, ""pm note 2.
59. Minow, Making Ailihe Difference, supra note 2, at 50-74.
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classroom of hearing children is deemed "differ nt" from the others and
treated separately by law as a result of that differen e.6(J
Second, this legal proces of difference labeling illegitimately a sume
certain "norms" from th standpoint of which it dee ms some persons
"different": ''The hearing-impaired student is differ nt in omparison to the
norm of the hearing stud l1l-yet the hearing student differs from the
hearing-impaired tudent as much as she differs from him . .. . "6 1 For
Minow, this "norming" proce s is problematic becau 'e "[ u]nstated points of
r ference may express the xperi nee of a majority or may e, pI' ss the
perspective of those who have had gr ater access to th e power used in
naming and assessing others." The relatively powerless may suffer under
judgments of inferiority that result from this biased process of namin g and
norming.62 Minow offers many legally reI vant examples of this ritique of
legal categories, including the exclusionary labeling as "different" of disabled persons, of stud nts whose first language is not Engli h, of racial
minorities, of gays and lesbians, of women, and of religious minoriti S.63 In
each case, Minow aver, some norm-of "abl ness," or English speak ing, or
whiteness, or mal nes ', or heterosexuality- has been used to justify treating
as different and inferior those who fail to omply with the norm.u4
Third, the law falsdy assumes that those who perfo rm these naming and
norming actions are themselves neutral, without a per peCliv .65 Differences are assumed to be objective, observable, and capable of legal categorization, reflecting the law's "aspiration to impartiali ty," an "aspiration
[that] risks obscuring the inevitable perspec tive of any given legal official ... and thereby makes it harder to challenge the impact of perspective
on the selection of u"aits used to judge legal consequences." The op ration
of the myth of impartiality, Minow conten ds, is illustrated by the defendant
in an employment case who urged Judge Constance Baker Motley to disqualify herself from the case "because she, as a black woman who had once
60. Id. at 81-83 (discussing case of Rowley v. Board of Eouc" 483 F. upp. 528 (S.D . . Y.
1980) , aJf'd F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980); rev'd 458 U.s. 176 (1982), involving dispute benveen
Rowleys and Board of EducaLion over whether federal law emi tled the Rowleys' hearing-impaired child, Amy, to a sign-language interpreter in all her cia ses, or whether the school's
educational plan , which supplemented Amy"> expe ri ence in "mainstream" classroom with
special tutoring, saLisfied the law). Minow nOtes, id. at 82, that "[b)oth sid s [in the case)
assumed that the problem was Amy'S: because she was difIerem fi'oll1 other stlldents, the
solution must focus on her. Both sides deployed the unstated nOrm of the hearing studelll who
receives educational input [rom a [cacheI', rather than im agini ng a different. norm around
which the enLire classroom might be co nstrIlCled."
61. [d. at51.
62. M See aiso, Young,justia< and the Politics of Difference, supra note 2, at 169 (,The attempt
to reduce all persons to the un ity of a commo n measure constrllcts as o eviant those whose
alu'ibmes differ from the group-specific alu;butes impli citly presumed in the norm. The drive
to unify the particu larity and multiplicity of practices ... turns difference into xclu ion ").
63. Minow, Makillg AU the Difference, Sf/11ra note 2, at 31-47.
64. !d. at 51 - 52 (describing how U.S. constitutional equa li ty n orms '"[make) the recognition
of differences a basis for denying eq ual treatmem·').
65. Id.
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repre ented plaintiffs in dis rimination cases, would identify with tho e who
suffer ra or e discrimination. Th defendant a sumed that Judge Motley's per onaJ identity and h r past politicaJ work had made h er different,
lacking th [normal judicial] abili ty to perceive without a perspectiv ."66
Declining to reuse herself, Judge Motley pointed out that "[i]fbackground
or sex or rac of each judge were, by definition, sufficient grounds for
removal, no judge on this court could hear this cas [since] ... all of them
were attorney , of a S x, often with di tingul hed law firm or public ervice
backgrounds. "67
Fourth, the per pective of tho being labeled "differ nt" is either ignor d outright or assumed to have b el accounted for by thos who create
and maintain th particular norm in question. 58 Thus,
many legal observers have viewed aflirmative action as nonneutral, compared
with status quo u'eatments of race and gender in employment and other
disu'ibutions of societal resources. Proposals to alter rules about gender roles
encounter objections, from both men and women , to what is seen as undesirable disruption in the expectations and predictability of social relationships.
uggestions to in tegrate schools, private clubs, and other social institutions . .. provoke protests that these changes would interfere with freedomreferring, often expli itly, to the freedom of those who do not wish to
associate with certain oth rs.69
Fifth, these legal and social practices reinforce the false assumption that
our xisting institutional arrang ments are natural, neutral, and therefore
inevitable. 7o
Minowargue that the root problem with this way of handling difference
is that it creates and perpetuates inequality: ''Buried in the questions about
difference are assumptions that difference is linked to stigma or deviance
and that sameness is a prerequisite for equal ity."7 I On her view "[d]iffernce is relational, not intrinsic,"72 because "[wJho or what hould be taken
as the pain t of reference for d fining differences is debatabl ." From the
viewpoint of the m~jority a person in a wheelchair is "handicapped"; from
that person's perspective the majority may be termed 'Temporarily ble
Persons." Whose point of view should serve as the anchor of law is a
question that must be discussed rather than buried.73 related assumption
66. hi. a t 60-61.
67. /d. a t 61.
68. {d.
69. !d. a t 71 .

70. Id.
71. Id. a t 50. SP.P also Mino\\', Group Homes f or the MentaUy Relarded, supra note 2, at 113
("Ca tegorical approachc "-attributing difference to different peop le- undermin e commitmentS to equality).
72. /d.
73. Id. at 51.
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is that "[t]here is no single, superior perspective for judging questions of
difference. No persp ctive asserted to produc ' the truth' is without a
situated perspective, because any statement is made by a person who has a
perspective. "71 Assignments of difference are social decisions that reflect,
and therefore offer a chance to explore, the structure of power and hierarchy in society, to reveal its plasticity, and thereby to empower ourselves to
change it. 75
Minow claims lhat the assumptions about difference that underly our
law result in apparently unsolvable "difference dilemmas, " presenting
equality advocates with a choice between acknowledgin g certain differences, such as handicaps, race, or gender, via "special treatment" programs
that may simultaneously reinforce th stigma attached to the difference ,
or ignoring the difference altogether, which can itself make the difl'erence
continue to matter given underlying social inequality.76 Thus, with respect
to race- and gender-conscious affirmative action programs, the "dilemma
of difference" involves questions of how to avoid the stigma traditionally
attached to race and gender while trying legally to remedy the wrongs
done by labeling women and minorities as both different and inferior.
As Minow phrases it: "How can historical discrimination on the basis of
race and gender be overcome if the remedies themselves use the forbidden categories of race and gender? Yet without such remedies, how can
historical discrimination and its legacies of segregation and exclusion be
transcended?"77
It follows that solving the difference problem is not simply a matter of
either ignoring difference or openly accommodating it, as both methodologies result in serious problems for groups that have been disadvantaged by
treatmen t as "differ n t. "78
Minow urges the questioning and rejecting of norms that justify inferior
treatment for groups such as the disabled, foreign-language speakers, racial
minorities, and women. 79 And she suggests methods of furthering her
underlying equality ideal by incorporating difference into the social structur in ways that purge them of hi erarchy.80 For example, she recommends
dealing ,vith communication problems bel:\. . een a hearing-impaired child
and her hearing classmates by teaching all the chi ldren sign language. Such
an approach, Minow claims, "would treat the problem of difference as

74. Id. at 53.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 20, 25, 27, 36.
77./d.

78. See generally ill.
79. See, e.g., Min ow, WlIt'1l Difference Has It" Ho"'~, supra no te 2, at 128 ("Categories and
attributions of difference can perpetuate or increase disparities of power between different
groups. Attributions of difference should be sustained only if Lhey do noL express or confirm
the distributi on of power in ways that harm the less powerful and benefi lthe more powerful").
80. Minow, Making AU/he Difference. supra note 2, at 81-84.
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embedded among all the students, making aU of them part of the problem,"
rather than "assum[ing] that the problem of difference is located in th
hearing-impaired child. ~

2. Rights and Exclusion
Recall the question that prompted this discussion of Professor Minow's view
of difference; How does that view differ (if at all) from a liberal view of the
relation hip betw n differe nce and equality? The a nswer requires an
evaluation of both Minow's critique of liberal-rights analysis and of her
affirmative proposals to re place it
a. Minow's critique of liberalism. Although Professor Minow acknowledges that liberal rights-based approaches to law can remedy discrimination against some persons, she claims that in the end liberal visions of
equality, grounded in the sameness of rationality or autonomy, improperly exclude those who do not possess the requisite degree of these qualities8l :
De pite its liberatory rhetoric of inclusion and fundamental entitlement, the
analysis of rights. developed in constitutional and statutory judicial doctrines
in this country, runs aground on the shoals of the two-track system of legal
treatme nt. On track offers basic rights to self-dete rmination and participation for tho e who satisfy the criteria of rational thought and independence;
the other offers special trea Lment and, quite often, social and political exclusion. Those treated as "different who can demonstrate that they correctly
belong on th first track may find considerable h elp through the rhetoric of
rights. hose who fail to satisfy th test of "sameness," however, may find
rights analysis a bitter remedy that undermines whatever pas t acknowledgment of difference there had been without producing social and political
inclusion .82
ft

Minow argues that liberal "sameness" assumptions endanger the few special benefits accorded to the historically "different"; 'Thus, efforts to eliminate gender bias in divorce law have removed alimony and child-custody
provisions that pre~ rred women, and some observers attribute to these
reforms the increased impoverishment and worsened bargaining position
of women following divorce. "83 In short, rights-based approaches to law
end up reinforcing inequality not only by embracing the legal processes
of differ nce-creation e mbodied in the five core assumptions outlin d
81. See, e.g. , Minow, id., supra note 2, at 147 ("Righ ts analysis offers release from hierarchy
and subordination to those who can match th e picture of the abstract, autonomOIJS individual
presupposed by the theor y of rights. For th ose who do not ma tch that picture, application of
rights analysis can be not on ly unresponsive bUl also punitive").
82. fd. at 146.
83. Id. at 146-47.
84. See supra, text accompanying notes 59-70.
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above,84 but also by hiding the continuation of social, political, and legal
hierarchy behind the (false) app arance of equal opporlun ity.85
At its core, this critique attacks the liberal assumption that autonomy is a
species-wide trait among humans,86 charging that this assum ption illegitimately xcludes some persons. 87 T hus, Minow's fundamental complaint i
against liberal equality as justification: She argues thal grounding legal rights
in the descriptive samenesses of agency, rationality, or autonomy is wrong
because it is exclusion a ry.88

85, See, e,g, , t.Iinow, Making AU the Differnue, supra note 2, at 152 ("Pretense of universal ,
in clusive norms in the public sphere obscures the power of assigned d ifferences in the pli,'ate
sphere "); ,iii. at 223 ('The relational challe nge suggests that [the limits SCI. on responsibi liLies
by rights analysis] reflect a particular perspective not because it is correct but beG1USe it
expresses the worldview of those who have had sufficient power to shape preva iling social
institmions") ; id, at 217 (feminist work has con tributed to the relational project by "recastin g
issues of 'di fference' as proble ms of dominatj on or su bordin aLion in order to di sclose the social
relatio n ships of power withi n wh ich difierence is named and enforced"); id. at 224 ( ocial
relatio ns approach sees "[d ]ifferences that yield social d istance and exclusion. , , as the selfsening expressions of th e more powerful") ; id, at 239 ("Those who \'~n a given struggle for
control may have be tter access to the means of producing knowl edge, such as mass media and
schools. Such control Illay even shape th e terIllS of access so that exclusions of other points of
liew appear neutral, based on merit or on other standards endorsed even by th ose who remain
e xcluded") ,
86, F..g" id. at 1.55 (criLicizin g as inelitably situated the libera l reliance on noLion of "amonamous, able-bodied " person); id. at 150 ("the heuri tic delice of the soc ial COI1lract presumes to
address only autonomous, independent individuals") ; id,at2 16 (chargin g tIl ,1l ri ghts analysis
applies only LO tho e who are, or can analogize themselves to , independent persons); id, at 147
("Righ ts analysis ofiers release from hierarchy and subordination to those who can match tile
picture of the abstract, autonomous indilidual presupposed by the theory of rights. 'or tIlOse
who do not match that picture, application of lights analysis can be not on I)' unresponsive but
also punitive").
87. See, e.g., id, at 152 ("Despite the impl ied aspiraLion to universal inclusion, th e social
ContraCl approach has been deeply exclusionar y"); id. at 153 (- rhe presentation ofa type of
human being as though it d escribed all human beings risks excludin g any who do not fit or
treating such misfits as deliant."); ill, at 154 ("Rawls's differcnce p ri ncip le prc erves too mu ch
of th e concept of til e ab tract individual-a con cept that claims but fai ls to secure universality-to respond fully to issues of difference"); id. at 155-56 (''The natural rights u'adition also
partakes of the assumpLions of the au tonomo us and abstract ind ividual and excludes or
subordinates any who fai l to meet these assumptions"); id, at 156 ('~rh e premise of a basic
hum an nature, fo und in the abstract individual capabl e of reaso n , undergirds [natural law]
th eory and risks excluding any who do not mee t. it. Theories of natu ral law locate the
jusLification for universal rights in human reason or cogniLion, Th is focus o n reason makes
probl ernaLic any person s who do not manifest to the sa tisfac Lion of tIlOse in charge til e requisite
capacities for raLion al though t," and nflering children and th e mCI1laJl y disabl ed as examples
of such excluded persons).
88. E.g., id. at 146 ("Th e 'sameness' between peopl e emphasiled by ri ghL~ analysis challenges special accommodations made for disabl ed pt:ople, wome n , and others h istorically
treated as d ifferent"); id, at 152 ("All per,on s are equal because of this Fundamental samen ess-yet th is samen ess seems lO be the emptiness left when we are each sheared of all that
makes uS dillere nt"); id, at 223 ("Equating sameness with equality, righ ts analysis oilers a k.ind
of certainty and a set of limits: equal treatment, yes, but limited to a eompatison with the other
group"); see also Young,jllsliceand lite Politics oiDifference, supra note 2, at17 1 ("In general , then ,
a relaLionaI understa,nding 01 group differen ce rejects exclusion ").
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This ~argu ment fro m ex clu s i on~ cannot survive analysis, for at least tv.·o
reasons. First, the argume nt rests upon a dramatically impoverished conceptio n of liberalism. Professor Millow writes tha t, d espite its ~ad mira bl e
comm itme n t to u niversali ty and inclusion,"
the [liberal] social comr.J.ct approach has been deeplyexdusionary. It is not
only that any sign of difference, any shred of situated perspective, threatens
Ule claim to similarity, equality, and identity as an absu'act individual-although these problems are serious enough; it is that this conception amounts
to a preference for some points of view oller others; it takes some types of
people as the norm and assigns a position of difference to others (thus
adopting the assumption s behind the difference dilcmma).89
Altho ugh it is true tha t some forms of liberalism re ly on the existen ce of
certain th resho ld levels of rationality and / or autonomy in humans, it is
e mphatically not tr ue that ~a n y sign of diffe rence .. , th reatens the clai m to
simila ri ty, equali ty, ~ etc., on the liberal view. As the discussion above pointed
out, liberalism accommodates a substantial array of difference and that
accommod ation is exp/iail)' grounded in the liberal's prior respect fm- fimdamental

samene5s. 90
Second, Minow's d e piction of liberal autonomy is fatally shallow. AI
various poi n ts she describes autonomy as syno nymo us with be ing ablebodied and wi th physical inde pendence from others, suggesting that the
liberal's ~autono m ous~ person must possess not on ly the capacity fo r ratio n al deliberation and ch o ice ma king but also th e abili ty physically to carr y
o ut those ch o ices. 91 But this vicw relies o n far tOO thin a con ception of
autonomous action. c..n Christo ph er Reeve, now a quadriplegic, be said to

89. /d. at 152.
90. Supra text accompan}1ng notes 14-33.
91. !in. t.g., Min ow, Making All 1M DifftrtllU, supra note 2, at 155 (criticizing rights theory for
its "a$SUlllption of an autonomous, able-txxlied perso:m "); id. at 150-51 ("The heurislic deo.ice
of th e social contract presumes to address only autonomous, independent individu;ds who can
separate themselves from others and enter freel~', unencumbered, into an agreement aboout
how (0 conduct pri\"ale and public affairs. .. A very different design for ... conceiving of the
foundations of a society would be llecessary in order to include directly those who "1thin
contemporary society seem disabled and those h istori cally treated as incompetent and incapa·
ble of participating in Ihe formation of a rational consensus").
Other theorists have posited concepts of autonomy that add to rational choice-making
power the existence of a sufficient range of options and of the ability to act on one's choices.
!in, t.g., Fallon. rupra note 13, at 886 (offering modified Razian \1sion of autonomy a nd
claiming that "descriptive autonomy depends on at least four elements lhat constitute the
-condition s of autonoITlY-' (I) cri lical and sclf-critical a bility; (2) competence to aCI; (3)
sufficient options; and (4) independence of coercion and manipulation~). Fallon claims that
under this conception of autonomy, ")a) physically helpless person, such as a quadriptegic, is
not autonomous in important respects." Id. at 888. Once aw.tin, this v;"-w is \lltnerable \0 the
charge leveled against Minow-that il rests upon rar 100 sparse a conception of what it means
to "acI.-
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lack a req uisite level of a Ulonomy because he cannot physically do things
most oth ers can? Is Reeve, with the mo ney to h ire others to compensate for
h is disability, dearly less a utonomous l ilall , say, a com ple tely impoverished
but able-bodied person, or a severely retarded but able-bodied person? or
course nOL In fact, liberals have argued for special accommoda tions-such
as wheelchair access-for the physically disabled, in rerognition of their possesriM oJ the threshold level oJ autMomy that j ustifi es equal rights a nd responsib ilities. O n any reasona ble theory o f what it means to "act," individua ls do
not have to be able-bodied or physically independe nt to be autonomous in
the liberal sense; they must simply possess the moral a nd intellectual abili ty
to make certai n types of choices about their lives a nd lO make meaningful
attem pts, physically or otherwise, lO realize those choices.
Professor Minow is q uite critical of this idea that autonomy is fundame ntally a men tal capacity. For example, she allacks the scholarship of philo sopher David Lam b for "definin g human life in te rms of capaci ty for
thought," since Lam b's definiti on "would e xclude persons in a persiste nt
vegetative state. "92 Suppose this is correct- that liberal justifica tions of
equali ty that are grounded in descriptive assum ptions of human rationality
and autonomy do, in fact, "exclude~ those in a persiste nt \'egetative state
and perhaps some affiicted by severe me ntal disabilities. 9 .'1 In this context
"exd usi on ~ presumably refers to the lack of any equality-based justrfication
fo r u'eating such individuals as equals in a liberal society. T hose who lack
the requisite level of a utonomy or rationality have no claim to be treated as
equals in a regime whose justification of legal eg-dlitarianism is defin ed by
those qualities.
At one level this scenario simply highligh ts the limits of equali ty itself as
a legal principle. Arguably, the idea of equali ty-however justified and
however defin ed-does not work a t all in the context of arguing for be tte r
treatment of those whose disabilities have made the m permane ntly in capable not only of autonomous c ho ice making but also of forming relationships, of caring for themselves physically, o r (as in the case of comalOse
people) of even kn owing who, or tha t, they are. We might say, for exam ple,
that the person in a pe rsiste nt vegetative state has the "right" not to be killed
for spon. But is this "'right" an equality-based right? Surely not; the "'right" is
grounded not in the equality of the comatose person to the rest of humanity,
bm in other reasons-in o ur hope t11at such individuals will someday "wake
up," perha ps; or in our compassio n for the m and their fam ilies; or in our

92. Minow, MiU:ing AU 1M DifftmlU, supra note 2, at 152.
93. At times Minow lreaLS ch ildren a lld the memally disabled :u groups excluded by
liberalism. But th is is dramatically overreaching. As Minow herself concedes, liberal throry
acknowledges the personhood of children as JUrure a utonomous agents. /d. at ]56. And, unless
one defines "mental disabili ty· in such a way that il refers to extremely severe psychological or
cognitive deficits. it is far too simplistic to assume that all men tally disabled pcr$Ons lack
rationality or the capacity to make autonomous choices about their lives.
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conviction that allowi ng such killing would lead us to become callous
toward greater a trocities. 94
For the purposes of this essay, however, an even more important conclusion follows from Minow's charge that liberal sameness assumptions are
unjustly exclusionary. Notice that he r argumem im plies that "true eq u ality~
necessitates treating such people as equals, But that statement itself requires
justification. Upon what theory of equality is it based? Two possibi lities ex ist.
First, she could be a rgu ing not that sameness-based equal ity is per st' unjust,
but that autonomy and rationali ty are sim ply the wrong samenesses upon
which to ground assumptions of equal moral worth and legal equali ty. On
this theory lhe use of autonomy as equality's core justification is illegitimately exclusionary because ( I ) wha t makes persons equal is really someth ing else-relational ability or em pathy, for example-and (2) this truth
has been unjustly quashed by the a utonomy prin ci ple. AI least one advocale
for Ihe me ntally d isabled, for example, has a rgued th at assumptions of
equality based on the capacity for love, e mpathy, and ~co mmun a lity" ought
to replace autonomy-based legal structures that single out the melllally
disabled as different and inferior.95
But such proposals arc not available eith er to Minow or to other postm odern critics of liberalism, who consistently attack such ideas as "essentialist. ~
On the posunodern view, any assumption of sameness among humans is
suspect because it so often leads us to ignore or suppress radical difference.
For this reason Martha Minow consistently condem ns sameness-based
equality per st', a position that logically com pels her to rejcct proposals that
would simply substitute o ne for m of sameness for a nOlhe r.96 Autonomy,
connectedness, e mpathic ability--even species membership-are all samenesses that she necessarily rejects as bases for legal equality. So Minow m ust
be argu ing that, despite the fact that no sameness can properly ground
equality, all persons should nevertheless be treated as eq uals. But the crucial
point is this: Minow's critique of sameness-based equality kaves her un'th no
ansu..oer to the question o/why "We should treat all persons, including permanently
comatost' persons, as equals. 97 If people are radically and irreducibly different,
94. Or perhaps the "right" is ground.,.:! in a I'ery basic principle of "s.lmeness"-that of
species membership. But such a principle can only sefve as a very weak justification fOf legal
rights. For why ought species membership to justify slIch rights? The f<:adiesl fesponse is
phrased in terms of SOIM othrrquality that constitutes the real justification for the right_that
the human species shares the capacity for rationality, autonomy. empathy, moral pef~nality,
and so on. This takes the argument back to square one.
95. Robert L. Hayman,Jr., Prtsumptians ofjl>sliC'; I.mv, "olilir:s. fInd the fIImtally Rr/tlrriLd I'atml.
lOS ~RV. L. REv. 120\ ( 1990) (criticizing autonomy- and rationality-hased presumptions
employed in judicial decisions about parenting abilities of mentally handicapped persons. and
arguing \113t relational abilities of such persons should form the basis for a new legal standard
of evaluation of parenting abilities).
96. Nevertheless. she ultimately tries to go this route, and I evaluate her attempt in tile next
section. infra, text accompanying notes 99-116.
97. And a non-sameness--based justification of e<;juality seems entirely unanractive, for reasons I ....,11 discuss in the ne)[1 section. 5« infra, text accompanying note 150.
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what justi fi es legal equaliry? Mi llow ad\'ocatcs "real eq ual ity" thro ugh the
proper recogn itio n of differe nce; but such hopes are em pty rh c LOric in the
a bsence ofsQmc underlyingjustific<lt ion for the declared equality principle.
As I argue below,98 eq ualiry cannot be fully j ustified witho ut affirm ing
samen ess of some kind- the rejection of sameness, therefore. n ecessarily
im plies the rejection o f any rich theory o f legal equality.
h. M inow's "social relo.tions" approach: back 10 esse1rlialism. Th e discussion
thus fa r has revealed core weaknesses in Minow's atLack on li bera l samenessbased eq uality. As a liule renection makes clear, her proposed rqJw.a:mentfor
liberal legal structures is even more nawed. In place of conventional civi lrights methodology. which focllses on erasing miscategorizalio ns o f persons
as inferior in beh alf of an underlri ng be lief in the rational, autonomous sd fhood o f all human be ings,99 Professor Minow advances a suspicion o f categorization perse. Minow atlem pts to move the inquiry from one involving ~tru e~
and ~false ~ categories to one in\'olving th e dangers of categorization itself:
[T] he social relations app roach assumes that there is a b.1sic connectedness
between people, instead of assuming that autonomy is the prior an d essential
dimen sio n of personhood.
The social relation s approach is dubious of
the method o f social organization that constructs human rel~lIionships in
te r m s of immutable catego ries. fixed statuses and inherited or ascribed
traiL~.1()O

Min ow acknowled ges that categorization is necessary, but sh e warns that it
o u ght to be p rofoundly m istrusted owing to il~ histo ry of usc for the
purpose of creati ng power inequities.
Via her ~soc ial re l ation s~ ap proach to difference, Mi now seeks both to
acknowledge social categories and to re nder them powerless. Her proposal
contains several key e lemen ts. First, it d e picts difference as hie rarchical and
urges that prevailing social norms be exposed as simply th e poi n l~ of view
of the powerful and thereby ro bbed of thei r natural, intrinsic, and stable
auras. WI For Minow the key question to consider in evaluat ing the legal
response to an alleged difference is wh ether and how it affects human
relationships:
The [social relations] strat egy. . considers the relationship between the
namer an d th e named that is manilested in categories and labels and that is

98. "ifra. text accompanying note 151.
99. Sn discussion wpm. lext accompanying notes 32-33 (libe ral civil-lighl' mcthods
grounded in belicf that rniJCategorizalions must be supplanted by correct categorizations).
100. Minow. When Di//"",ct' Has 1150 HoNU'. ~"pm nOle 2. al 127-2R.
101. Sn. t ,g., Minow. M"ki~g All 1M Dijf«rmct'. supra nOle 2. at 80 ("· Difference can be
understood not as intrinsic but as a function of relationships. as a comparison dr.lwn between
;1Il indi\idual and a norm that can be stated and c\",llIat«l"); Minow. \\'hfn Di/Jl'TI'nrt Has 1150
HQIM. wpr" nOle 2, al 113 ("An egalitarian id"al would 1.><: better served by an approach Ihat
emphasizes the relationships between people").
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lived in daily experiences. Docs the act of naming cut off o r deny relationships? Affirmative answers 10 questions of th is son would support a conclusion that the attribution of diflcrence violates the foundational premise of
ongoing relatio nships. Such a violation should trigger protection for the
constitutionall y protected values of equality a nd freedo m of associalion. 102

This foclls 011 the primary imponan ce of relatio nships as the basis for legal
equality immediately raises two questions. First, if it is "ongoing relatio nships~ that oughllo trigger the e nforcement of constilUtional protections,
what happens to individuals-such as those in a "persiste nt vegelative state H
and those with severe me nlal disabi lities-who are incapable of form ing
relationshi ps wit h others? Isn 't Minow simply ad vocating a new for m of
essentialist sameness-the capacity to have relationships-and argu ing, in
d irect contradiction to her simuhaneous njection of sameness-based rights
per Sf, that this ncw sameness should replace autonomy and rationality as
thc proper j ustifi cation of equal ity? Ifso, Minow's social relations approach
raises the vcry same proble m of exclusion that prompted he r attacks on
liberal ism.
Second, the social relations approach relies heavily on the fac ul ty of
empath), as a way of produci ng discussions about difference bet.....een the
powerful and the dominated. Professor Minow writes that the social relations theofY is rooted in "learning to take the perspective ofanother,H and
she presents it as "an openi ng wed ge for an alterna tive to traditional legal
treaunents of difference."103 By ta lking a nd listening to others who are
different, those in power will come to realize that ~di ffe fe nce~ is relational
and debatabl e-lhat the hearing children in a classroom a re as different
from thei r deaf classmate as she is from them-a nd that issues of difference
thus necessari l)' place both the ~nor mal " and the '"different" person in
relationship to each other. Th us, Minow makes empathy, particularly judicial em pa thy, in to the chief means of moving society from the status quo,
which she depicts as illegitima tely individualist and eli list, toward a greater
focus upon the im portance of connectedness and relationshi ps.IO-I She
hopes that such em pathic perspective-laking wi ll help reconceive rights,
102. Minow, ll kon I)jJJt:m,,:~ HaIlt. Homt', supra note 2. at 130.
103. Minow. Milking AI/lilt DiffI':rfflU, supra note 2. at 379.
104. SN. {.g., id. at 384-87, 389 (discussing importance of such perspective taking): Minow,
llkon DiJJfmlu HIlS Its H~. supra nOte 2. al t2Y (discussing need for judges \.0 adopt the
IJerspective of (\lOse latx:1t:d "differenT-). Alone poim in her book Mi now denies that her
approach embraces empathy; _ id. at 219. But she seems only to intend by that statement to
sep.lfate herself from relation:d feminist cla ims that empathy is a namra!, organic, and/or
unre/le(t;l'cly easy process. at least for women. /d. at 219-20 {making ulis poim in COlllext of
a short story. -A Jury of Her l'ee rs-j. [n fact. Minow's advocacy ofperspectil'e laking constitutes
the tkfil1itioll of e"'pathy: _. ,.g., Robert M. Goldenson. 1 THE ENCYCI.OPEDIA OF I'!UMAN
BEHAI'IO R: 1's\UlOI.OGY. PS\I:::I!IATRY. A/lID MI'.NT.-I.L Ht:AI:fH 395 {1970} {defining em pathy as "the
capacity to Undef5tilnd ilnd in some meilsure shilre ilnother person's state of mind-}. Whether
emp.lIhy comes namrally or is an acquired (haracteristi(, and whether o r not women POSSCilS
it more than men, arc questions external to the definition of the (oncep1.
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preserving the ir liberating potential while grounding them not in rationality o r autonomy but in con ncCledness and the recognition of untranscend-

able perspective. lOr.
Th e usc of em pathy, or ~perspecti\'e t3king," as a means of im proving
liberal ism is hardly new. Communilarians and relationa l feminists see p0litical empathy as central to the effective replacement of liberal legalism
with more communa l, mutually interde pendent, a nd altruistic legal SlrUClures. 106 To the extent these proposals express the view tha t we should all
be nicer and more understanding of each o ther, they clearly have merit. But
the atlempt to deploy empathy as a new basis for legal decision making will
fail-and rightly so.

Empathy can be understood in two ways-as the imagined projection of
one's ~selJ into the person of another, or as an auempt to understand the
o ther as essen tially different, without trying to fuse o ne's identity with the
other's or to assume a basic sam e ness of ~selr between e mpathize r and the
other, The first understanding, which I have called ~projec tive empathy,"107
is not me rely consistent with liberalism; it is the foundation of liberal
progress toward the realization of equa l rights for aJI.l08 Projective em pathy
relies, in essential part, on the realization th at despite our differences, I and
the object of my empathic atle ntion are the same and therefore eq ual. This
view of em pathy may, in fact, have motivated the Supreme Court decision
in Brown v. Board of Educalion,l09 the most famous American civil-rights
case. 110 It is a view of pe rspective-taking that would be unacceptable to
Professor Minow, who repeatedly rejects the liberal no tio n that equality
ought to be based on sameness. lll She must rely, therefore, on a second

105. l\.linow, Maki~g Ali I~ Diffmma, supra note 2. at 382-83 (defending her concept of
-rights in relationship- as an important IOQI for challenging hierarchical effeclil of socially
created difference).
106. For examples of elllp<lthy's promotion as a tool of political and legal reform, 5«, ~.g.,
Nancy L. Rosenblum, ANonn;R IJIlERAUSJ,I: ROMANTICISM AND THE RECONSlll.UCTION OF UBERAL
THOUGHT 184 (1987) (linking communitarianisITl with a -politics of ... empathy"); (;ass Sunstein. &y<m.d Ik Rtpublirm, Ikviual, 97 YALE LJ. 1539, 1555 (1988) (explaining the concept of
political empath y and itsconnection to cOlllmunitarian vision s o f law); Robin West, u.w, Rights,
aM DIM 'l"olnnlr.IIlUJiaru: 1.Lglll Ubtralilm atul FrrodJ 1'h«Jry of1M Rult of lAW, 134 U. PA. L. REv.
S17,859 (1986) (associati ng promotion of empatJlic law with relational feminists and communitarians); _ gmer-ally Dailey, supra note 2. I have been skeptical about empathy's fKltential as
a tool for promoting legal communitarianisrn. Stt-Cynthia V. Ward, A Kiruln; Grolltr Libmllis"..·
Visions of t;mjJalhy in Fmlinisl "M Commutlilarian UlnaluTe, 61 U. Clil. L. Rev. 929 (1994). The
discussion in this section applies the conceptions of empathy introduced in tJlat article.
107. Ward , supra note 106, at 936.
108. /d. at 'J!H--45 (developing a conce pt of projective empathy as an inherent premise of
liberalism).
109. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110. For discussions of emp<lthy's possible role in the Brown decision, _, t.g.• Lynne N.
Henderson. 14f'llity ami Empathy, 85 MtCH. L. REv. 1574 ( 1987); Ward, supra nOle 106, at
941--42.
III. &t, t .g., Minow, Mak;"g AU 1M DifftmlO', supra note 2, at SO, 74-75 (citing defeclil of
equality principle hased on sameness).
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vision of em pathy, which I have called "imagina ti\'e e mpathy. ~112 This understanding of e mpathr acknowledges radical diversi ty-that e mpathizer
and other are ineradicably different and separa te-but nevertheless assumes that it is possible at least partially to understand the other despite his
or her difference. Imaginative empathy therefore recognizes diversity and
may escape reliance on sameness-but, I have a rgued, loses any in nate
connection with equali ty.1l3 While projective e mpathy sus through difference to find equality, imaginative empatlly stops at the point of acknowledging and appreciating difference, thereby losing any innate connection
to equality.114 The point should be clear: Liberalism incorporates an equality-friendly understanding of e mpathy that is rooted in sameness, whereas
nonliberal empathy stands in direct tension with equali ty. Professor Minow's social relations approach must fa il because its core premise. that
empathic "perspective taking" can simultaneously transcend sameness and
embrace equality, is false.

c. The emptiness of the postmodern vision of difference. I n sum, neither Minow's critical a ttacks on liberalism nor her affirmative proposals to replace
it can survive careful analysis. Her critique of liberal rights theories reduces
to one claim : That such theories improperly rely on the concept of au tonomy to justify equal a nd individual rights. Minow argues that this reliance
is wrong because it excludes some persons from being treated as equals,
resulting in the label ing of such individuals as "different" and inferior. But
her narrow depiction of the foundations of liberal though t, coupled with
her failure to otTer an equali ty-based justification for her universal inclusion
principle, leaves this critique com ple tely undefended.
Minow's affirmative argument for the "social relations approach~ not
only raises the spectre of essentialism-which she elsewhere fi rmly and
repeatedly repudiates ll L-but also relies heavily on a difference-based concept of empathy that is actually antieq uality. Two premises form the core of
the social relations approach: First, sameness-based theories of equality are
wrong because they label some persons as different and inferior; second,
our shared human capacity for e mpathic dialogue can lead us to real
equality. But to the extent it is rooted in the rejection of sameness, Minow's
theory fights with equality; and insofar as she introduces a new sameness,
the sameness of e mpathic a bility, as the proper basis for rights and legal
categories, Minow-like comm unitarians and relational feminists-simply
deploys the notion of difference as a stalking horse for her own particular
brand of same ness-based equality.116
112.
liS.
114.
115.

Ward. supra nOIe: 106. a1948.
(d. al 949.
Id.
E.g., Minow, MllAing AU 1M Di.JJf:mIu , supra note: 2. at 230-SI.
116. AI least one scholar has accused Minow or communitarian essentialism: _ Sheila
Foster. eom"umity a7UI Idnllily in a PrulmDikrn nl1rld, 7 BERKEL.EY WOMEN'S LJ. 18 1,185 ( 1992)
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IV. DIFFERENCE AS EQUALITY
It would seem from the above a nalysis that diffe rence-based attacks on
liberalism necessarily confl ict with eq uality. But this conclusion may be 100
hasty, for a third conception of differcnce--one that departs in importalll
ways from th e views d iscussed thus fa r- now dominates the literature in
cri tical race theory. In this section I consider whether this view of difference
is any more equality-friendly than its counterparts.

A. Difference in Critical Race Theory

Advocates of this tllird vision of d ifference share much wi th advocates of
poslmoclern difference theory. In particular, they accept the social<onsuuction explanation for the origin of difference, and they are even more
open than is Martha Minow about the connection between difference and
hierarchy.!17 Difference, on this view, is the deliberate assignmen t of inferiority, most promine ntly racial inferiority, by the white m.yority to racial
minorities. IIS Schola rs who adopt this view insist that we must recognize and
institutionalizc, via the establishment of affirmalive group righlS, group
differcnces that originated in racial oppression,I19

("Whether imended Of not, Minow's reconsu'uction of "righu; language- through the recognition of their -inevitable rdational dimensions-leads her down a familiar path of e mbo.lcing
-communitarianis1l1-) (citation omilled): i4. at 187 ("Thus, like advocates of the communitatian "'on~mcnt. Minow envisions a communi ty. uni,'ersal in nalUre, where the -language of
righu;" dntws each claimant into the com munity and -go.lnu; each a basis opporlUnity 10
participate in Ihe process of communal debate-).
117. Su, ' _g.. sources cited in nOle 51: _ also, from Ihe critical legal slUdies camp. Duncan
Kennedy. A Cultural Plurulis/ Cas.! JIlT AJJirmatiTJt Actio" i" 1-4f<l1 AcGlltmill, 1990 Dul'.E LJ. 705,
724 ("Though communities are dilTerem in wa~'li that are hest unrlerw).Jd UtTOugh the non-hie.-archical, ncutral idca of culture ... some differences are not like that. Americans pursue
their coHeetil'e and indil'itlual projecu; in a situation of group domination and group subordination. With respect to ... common measures of equality and inequality, we all recognize Ulat
some group!l are enormously better off than othcrs-).
118. Th is idea of difference as hierarchy is of COl1r~ sharcd by many feminisu and applied
by them to thc analrsis of gcnder issues. Su, ~.g., MacKinnon, supra note 34. at 219 (~Difference
is the I'clvet glol'c on the iron fist of [male] domination ").
119. &t. t ,g., Roy L Brooks and Mary Jo Newborn. Critical Rm:t TNorY ami aassieaJ-UlMml
Ciuil Rights .'\c!wlar.;hip: A Distimticm Without a Diffrrma?, 82 CAl.. L REv. 787, 804-44 (arguing
that critical-race critiques of liberal discrimination law imply abolishment of Title VII): Sheila
Foster. Diffm:na and Equality, SUprll note 2. at 154 (-At the core of a substantive concept of
diversity. under an cguality paradigtll, should be a COlllmitmellt LO include indhiduals wiul
differences that have been constructed i1l1o a basis for s)'litematic di sad,,,ntage and exclusion-): id. at 156 ("We mUSt establish institutional participatory patterns utat accept and valuc
the conuibutions of those dilTerences t.hat hal'e been left out"); Harris, TIu!Jurisprodma of
lUamstrurtiml. SUfJm note 2. at 761 ("Rauler tllan supporti ng assimilation to the dominant
culture, the nt.ow social mm-emcnu hal'e demanded a recognition of uleir members' 'difference'").
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At th e root of th eir proposed "politics of difference "120 is th idea that
disadvantaged groups-most prominently racial minorities-have developed distinct methods of viewing the world and functioning within it that,
as a matter of justice to those groups, must be preserved via the explicit
importation into law of group rights and special treatment. 121 The goal is
to promote eguality1 22-an equality based not on sameness, as in the liberal
r ubric, but on racial differences. As critical-race theorist AngeJa Harris puts
it, "This claim to equality based not on sameness but rather on difference
is at th e heart of th politics of diffe rence. "123
On a critical-race-theory view, Martha Minow's concern fo r the dangers
of categorization actually overlooks the positive aspects of difference for
those groups that have been marginalized. According to Sheila Foster, for
exam pI , the danger of Minow's approach is that "Min ow leaves the power
of transformation, this tim with respec t to creating identities, in the ha nds
of those already in power. "124 Foster argues that Minow's ocial relations
theory constitutes an appeal to the already powerful to listen to the perspectives of the marginalized , while Foster urges more action by the latter
themselves to control th e meaning and consequences of difference 125 :
Categori zation ... has been and continues to be a means by which those
marginalized gro ups can empow r themselves by redefining the assigned
meaning of difference. Categories, like rights, need to be rescued to allow
those marginalized by essentialist categorization to empower themselves by
altering, for themselves, the meaning of categories of difference imposed on
them by those in power.... Marginalized groups can rescue categories by
claiming those cat gories and by transforming negative meanings associated
with th m in to positive ones that they create. The empowerment in this
process of transformation comes not only in protesting the assigned meanings of a cat gorical difference, but also in the recognition of the power to
detlne th at difference for th community of individuals embracing the diIIerence. 126

Condemning Minow's "seemin g willingness to get rid of categories altogether"127 and h er "placement of the power of transformation in th e hands
ofth powerful, "128 Foster concludes that a universal c<?mmunity built upon
J 20. T he term is u8ed by Ilarris, The ju.ispru.dcn.ce of Reconsl'ruction, supra n ote 2, at 159-66,
and Young ,justiU! and the Politics of DijJerence, supra n ote 2.
121. Young , Justice and the Politics of Difference, supra note 2, at 156-91 (ou tl ining te n ets of
"politics of differen ce" and describing specific group rights we h a pol itics would favor).
122. FOSLer, Difference and Equality, supra n Ote 2, aL 109, 110.
123. Harris, Juris-prudence of Reconslruclirm, supra note 2, at 761 .
124. Foster, supra n ote 11 6, at 191.
125. Foster acknowledges that Minow creates discursive space for "a differen t analy~i s" when
·self-as8igned differences" are at Slake, id. at 19 1, but feds that Minow pays too little attention
to this aspect of difference and fails to build it into her social re lations approach. Jd. at 191- 93.
126. Foster, Difference and EquaJil)I, sltfrra note 2, at 192.
127. ld. at 192.
128. Jd.
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~true equality" can be achieved only by "acknowledging and respecting the
power of the marginalized to reclaim and transform the meaning of assigned categorization."129 Foster suggests that achieving racial equality will
require us "to [both] deconstruct difference and allow marginalized groups
to empower themselves through sameness." She urges groups that have
been labeled different and inferior-such as racial minorities, gays and
lesbians, and possibly others-to ~aff1rm sameness by defining a common
identity on the fringes. " 130
Other critical race theorists echo this theme. Roy L. Brooks and Mary Jo
ewborn, for example, explain that critical race theory (CRT) rejects the
color-blind "formal equal opportunity" model (the vehicle for liberal hopes
of racial equality) "for erroneously assuming the possibility and desirability
of racial sameness, or equal legal treatment, and for ignoring legally significant differences beaveen African Americans and whites. "131 They argue for
an "asymmetrical model " of racial equality that will "assume the possibility
and desirability of raciaL differences. " ParaLleling their depLoyment in theories of sexual equality, asymmetrical models of racial equality hold that the
races are "often asymmetrically located in society" and reject "the notion
that all [racial ] differences are likely to disappear, or even that they
should. "132 Brooks and Newborn contend that "a degree of racial imbalance-that is, racial empowermenl-must be tole rated in order to reach
this state of racial balance ... . Racial em powe rme nt is the only way to
neutralize unconscious racial d iscrimination in American cuLture. By encouraging us to respect racial differences, racial empowerment val idates the
life experiences of minorities."\33
Critical race theorist Angela Harris writes that CRT draws on insights
from both the postmodern and liberal civil rights movements. 134 From the
former, CRT inherits the conclusion that "racism is an inescapable feature
of western culture, and race is always already inscribed in the most innocent and neutral-seeming concepts. Even ideas li ke 'trut1, ' and 'justice'
themselves are open to interrogations that reveal their complicity with
power."J 35 From the latter, CRT takes "a commitment to a vision of liberation from racism through right reason."\ SG oting the "te nsion " between

129. Id. a t 193.
130. Foster, supm note 11 6, at 193 (q uoting f"om Alexander Chec. A Queer NalionaliS'1I4
O UT/ LooK 15, 17 (Wimer 1991) ; see also Kennedy, mpra note 117, at 730 (discussing the
"irreducibl e li nk of commonali ty in the experience of people of color: rich or poor, male or
fema le, learned or ignorant, ail people of color al'e to some degree 'outsiders' in a society that
is intensely color-consciolls and in which th e hegemony of whites is overwhdming") (citation
omitted) .
13 1. Brooks and Newborn, .mpra nOte 11 9, at 800.
132. ld. at 802.
133. ld. at 802-03.
134. Harris, supra nOte 2 , at 743.
135. Id. at 743.
136. {d.
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th ese two planks of critical race th eory,137 H arris nevertheless urges the
movement to work within thi s tension and , via a 'J urisprude nce of reconstruction ," to "co ntinua lly rebuild modernism in lig ht of postmodern insights."138 Harris argues that CRT will be aide d in this task by iLS
engagement in the "politics of diffe r nce,"139 which she characterizes as
contai ning a "dual commitment to e liminating oppression and celebrating
differen e."140 "[T] he domestic politics of difference ," continues Harris,
"has focused on ... the constitution or reconstitutio n of the subordinated
community a nd th e transformation of th e domin ant community."141
B. Samen 55 Revis it d

These ideas may have much political ulility1 42; the effort here is to isolate
and ana lyze the co ncept of differe nce they employ. Two fundamental as ·ertions lie at its base . First, critical-race theo rists urge groups that have been
assigned th e label "differe nt" a5 a badge of inferiority to emlJrace that difference in order to "reclaim " it. 143 Second, th eir goal appears to be to craft
racial equality from such differe nce, to build a "politi cs of difference" that,
grounded in the group 's intemalsameness of shared oppression, takes racial
equali ty to be its foundational goal.
1. Sameness from Diff erence?
To reclaim difference in the name of equality, when dif~ rence has meant
inequali ty, is to embrace an internal tension. But, consistent with the postmode rn conviction that individual character and pe rsonali ty are socially
constructed, this th eory of difference proposes to resolve that tension by
giving the power to transform the meaning of difference to those who have
been labeled inferior. On this view reclaiming difference means both acknowledging the negative impact of socially assigned difference on th e
members of disadvantaged groups, and transfo rming th e negative content of
the "diffe rence" label into an affirmation of group ide ntity and group-based
politi S.144

137. !d.
138. Ill. at 744.
139. {d.
140. {d. at 760.
141. /d. 3 1 764.

142. RT sc hola rs have ' mphasized Ihe importance of the ir work to lhe political fight for
racialjusuce. See, e.g, C ha rl es R. Lawrence Ill , The Ward (Ind tile River: Pedagogy as ScllOWrshilJ as
StruggiR, 65 CAL. L. REV. 223 1, 2239 (1992) (cducal-race sc ho larshi p "must ... respond to the
immerliate needs of the oppressed a nd ubordinated "); Richard Delgado, On Telling StOlies in
SdlOoi: A RPfJ/Y 10 /'·fII-un (llZd S IIPIT)" 46 VANO . L. REv. 665, 673-74 ("Outsider scholarship is ofte n
ai med no t at unde rstanding th e law, but at cha ngi ng it"); Brooks and Newborn, .mpm no te 11 9,
at 844 (citing Lawre nce and Delgado for these poin ts).
143. Foster, D'f!errr,.a tlmi Fqu(l/il), SUI)'" note 2, a t 193.
144 . Ye generally Foster, supm no te 11 6; Foster, Di[fermce a"lu/ Equ{llity, supra nOte 2.
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This view is in some meaningful way antiliberal; it views liberal individualism and individual rights as masks fo r white domina tion of minoritie ,
while it celebrates the lib rating potential of gro up identity and group
rights. It also deep ns th conception of group id ntity beyond that contained in liberal pluralism, which envisions "interest groups" that are constructed by preform ed individuals who engage in collective behavior only
as a result of preexisting, di tinct int rests that happen to coincide. 145 The
"di£ference"-based view in ists on the primacy of group identity as a fac tor
in constructing individual identity, and on th importance of membership
in societally powerful groups. 146
Upon examination, how ver, this third view of difference collapses of its
own weight. Consider first that the acquisition of the powe r to transform
meaning must be justified by a purpose other than (or at least in addition to)
the mere effects of power-holding. The CRT conception of difference
focuses upon the raw experience of power as transformative, but doe n't
itself answer the central question of what values that power will serve. Toward
what end, in other words, do differ nce advocates argue for the reclamation
and reinforcement of diff rence via the simultaneous transformation of its
content into a positive one? If CRT theod ts were asked to state th e purpose
of the "politics of difference," they would surely answer "the a hi evement
of racial justice." And what constitutes racial ju tice? Th e usual an wer i ,
"equality between the races. "147 The new and tran formed content of difference is meant, perhaps, to give positive meaning to th phrase" parate but
equal"- to affirm the equality of groups whose relation hip ha lon g been
that of oppressor and oppressed but which are now to be treated as simply
145. See, e.g., Sunstein , supra. note 106 (describing liberal pluralism in these terms); Cynth ia
V. Ward , The Limits of Liberal Republicanism: Why GrollJrBased Remedu.s and Rtpllblican Citiunship
Don', Mix, 91 CotUM. L. REv. 58 1 (1991) (contrasting liberal pluralism with communilarian

republicanism) .
146. See, e.g., Foster, Difference and F.qllaMv, slIpra note 2, a 158-59 ("The dominant culture
has exerc i8ed its power to develop social and cultural defmitions for those deemed o utside of
that culture. Conseq uently, th e story of Blacks and other minorities has been created and told
primarily by "/hites, with little contribu tion from tlle su bjects tllemsclvcs. Blacks an d other
minotities have been effectively rendered 'invisi ble' not because Whites can not see them , but
because 'whi tes see primali ly what a white dom inant cu lrure has train d them to see' and
because the Black stories ' simply do not register ' ''); Kenn edy, supra note 11 7, a t 722 ("An
important hum an reality is the experience of defining oneself as 'a member of a group' in this
sO'ong sense of sharing goals and a discu rsive practice''); id. at 723 ("Communitie have
cu ltures. T his means that indi,iduals have traiLS lhat are neither geneti ally d termined nOr
volun tarily chosen, b ut rather consciously and unconsciously taugh t through commu nit), life.
Commu ni t), life forms customs and habi ts, capacities to produce li nguistic a nd o th er performances, and individual understandings f good and bad, true and false, worthy and unworthy");
Yo ung, iustice and the Politics of Difference, SlI/Jra note 2, a t 163 ('"Today and for the foreseeable
futu re societies are certai nly structured by groups, and some are p ri\~leged wh il others are
oppressed") .
147. But see Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REv. 363, 373-74 (1992) (argu ing that
African Americans should abando n quest for racial eq ua li t), and focus on bettering th eir
situation in society); Derrick Bell , f ACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: T HE PERMANENCE OF
R ACISM 12 (1992) ("Blac k people will never gain equ ali ty in this country") (emphasis o mitled)_
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different from, but nev rtheless equal to, each other. But "equal" in what
sense? The creation of group-defining "sam ness" from shared oppression-or from cultural traditions that originated in shared oppression-actually 'relies upon the ontinuing existence of difference between groups.
Difference from the other becomes the basis for sameness within the group,
for the very definition of the group as a group.
On what basis, th n, can group A argue that its memb rs should be
treated equally to group B? Group definitions that rely upon the shared
"difference" of oppres ion might create community and a sense of equali ty
within a group, but cannot justify the establishment of equality between
group. If the goal is to win equality for one's group vis-a.-vis all other groups
in society, some other justification of the intergroup equality principle must
be advanced. 148 I submit that this justification can only be grounded in
ameness-not on ly the samenes of group members to each other, but the
sameness of all groups to all oth er groups, or in other words, the sameness
of all human beings.
2. Can Equalil)1 Be Based on Difference?
At one level th critical-race view of difference simply constitutes an argument for a distributive principle of equality. Difference theorists argue for
equal distribution of resources and power to groups whose subordination
previously compris d the steps in th e social ladd r. Once again, however,
this principle of distribution must b justified at a deeper level-must
answer the question of why we sh ould distribute power equally.
At the level of justification this strain of difference theory is incoherent.
CRT scholars reject the liberal idea thal rationali ty and autonomy are
the proper bases on which to construct legal rights, arguing either that
thos ideas are innately biased in favor of the white male elite and designed
to perpetuate its dominanc , or that autonomy and rationality are epheme ral to start with. Instead, radical theorists argue for equality based on
difference, I<
19 and although this might work at the distributiv level-it is at
least theoretically possible to d cide which "differences" have created relevant groups and to distribut money, j obs, and/or political positions equally
among all groups deemed r I vant by the agreed-upon criteria of difference-it is completely unintelligible at the justifi atory level, a fault that
leaves difference theory without any equality-based answer to th question
148. Relalional feminiSl lheory also faces this problem. Some of Robin 'West\ work , for
e ample, suggests lhat women are profoun dl y different from men al. every level. See, e,g., WeSl.
;ulna note I , al 17 ("According to the vasllile,"alure on d ifference now being developed by
cu ltura l fem inists, women's cognitive de,'elopmenl, literary sensibility, aesthetic tasle, and
psychological development, no less than our analomy, are all fundame ntally different from
men ·s. , ., The most signifi calll aspecl of our difference, though, is surely Lh<: moral differenc<:"), If Lhis i true, women 's equalilY lO men (ralhe r than preferential or inferior treatment)
requ ires an indepen d ent argumenl showing why women, alth ough so very different, nevertheless possess eq ual worlh.
149, See, e.g" Harri s, supra note 2, at 761,
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of why we should di tribute power equalJy a mong racial groups. To the
extent difference theory demonstrates the existence of radical, irr ducible
diffe renc among groups, it undercuts th justification for working toward
equali ty for those groups. Why, in hort, should we treat people as equals if
they in fact are irreducibly diffe rent? At the very least, an a nswer to this
question requires an analysis of what differe nc s exist between gro up and
some conclusion th at, alth ough differen t, the groups' values, identities,
purposes, etc., are neverthe less equal. 0 such discussion appears in radical
differen ce theory.

3. Equalit)1 without Sameness?
There are of course justifications for political principles of eq ual distribution that do not rely on the establishm e nt of sameness among all persons.
One could argue, for example, that treating people as equal is necessary
to preserve law and order, or to maximize h appiness or minimize suffering-a utilitarian view. But such justifications capture neith r th spirit nor
the pronounced beliefs of radical difference theo ry. The p ace-and-order
rationale is both e mpirically dubiou - law and orde r have been pre erved
for long periods in hi e rarchical socie ties and dramatically violated in egalitarian ones- and politically uninspiring. It shrinks discussions about the
proper vision of social justice into squabbles over the com parative virtues of
various bureaucratic peacekeepin g stra tegie . At I ast some utilitarian views
may b similarly limited, as critical-race theorist Derrick Bell 's writings
ill ustrate. O n a straightforward reading of Profe or Bell 's work, one could
reasonably conclude that a uti litari an approach to racial justice would result
in the re te ntion ofa rigid racial hie rarchy in the Un ited States. Bell believes
that subordinating blacks is an esse nti al part of the white majority's identity
in this country, and in fact that whites have such a strong preference in favor
of oppressing blacks tha t they will never allow racial hierarchy to end. 150
If this is correct, calls for racial justice rely at their pe ril on utilitarian
rationales.
V. CONCLUSION: DIFFERENCE AND DOUBLESPEAK

It would seem that any acceptable justification of eq uali ty requir the
establishment of orne descriptive same ness among people. t the moment
one asserts that rw important commonali ty of persons can be established or

150. Seegenerally Be ll . Racial Realisl1~ supra nOle 147; Bell, FACES AT THE BoTTOM O'-THE Wtl.L,
supra n Ole 147; see al50 Brooks and ewborn, supra nOle 119, al 798 (ra ism is "normal science"
in th e U nited States); H arri s, s!ll;ra nOle 2, at 749 ("Derric k Bell argues lhal racism is a
permanent feature of lh e American landscape, not somelhing we can Lhrow off in a magic
moment of emanci pation . And in a mom ent of deep pessimism, Ri chard Delgado's fictional
fd end 'Rodrigo Cren shaw ' has suggesLed lhal racism is an inuinsic reatu re or lhe 'The
Enligille nme nt' iLSeir-) (citations omitted).
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can legitimately form the basis of citizenship, one is left without a rich
defense of egalitarianism.
The assault on "equality as sameness" must take onc of two routes. Either
its consists of a charge that the wrong sameness has grounded politics and
law, or it implies the rejection of equality altogether. Tn the first instance,
difference theorists are left to find and defend some new commonality (a
task they have so far rejected as "essentialist") 15 1, in which case the current
focus on the "difference" question ought to be transcended in favor of an
open debate over which vision of equality is the best. In the second instance,
difference advocates are left to discover an entirely new, nonequality-based
structure for law and politics. If political and legal equality are not proper
goals given the "differcnce" critique, what should be our goals? In the name
of what principle should we worry about differences in power between the
races and genders? In an environment of irreconcilable "difference," how
should we make justice-based arguments for change, or even think about
justice itself? Scholars who deploy radical views of difference in order to
argue for social justice must bear the burden of answering these questions.

151. See gtmemlly Harris, su.pra nOle 40; Elizabeth Spelman, supra nOle 46.

